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'The will to change begins in the body, 
not in the mind.
My politics is in my body, 
accruing and expanding 
with every act o f  resistance 
and each o f  my failures.
' Adrienne Rich ‘Tear Gas’ Poems Selected and New 1950-1974, Norton, New York 1974 .140
Abstract
This study details a quest. It is a quest to uncover what bodies signify in contemporary 
society, and especially what women’s bodies signify in a world where they are vulnerable 
to gender-specific violence. It is a quest that seeks to find what informs the relationship of 
one body to another and the interaction between them. It is a quest to discover if it is 
possible, or helpful, in this situation for women’s bodies to be re-visioned as ‘sacred’. In 
this study, seeking to discover these things leads to engagement with some leading theorists 
on the ‘body’. It involves addressing the issues that surround speaking of ‘women’ or 
‘women’s experience’ in a postmodern world. Ultimately, it leads to engagement with the 
lived experience of a group of women who are life-long church members. In this research, 
creative methods, group work, and life-history interviews allow participants to share their 
own experiences of embodiment, and to reflect on them and the interface between their 
everyday lives and their worship experience.
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Introduction
My starting-point -  why search at all?
This search for ‘sacred’ bodies^ began for me in March 2001 when I attended a conference 
in Geneva. The conference brought together women who live in situations of war and 
conflict across the world. They gave first-hand accounts of what happens to women in such 
situations. They also told of the endemic violence that women in their societies suffer. 
Hearing their stories, sharpened for me, an existing concern for the bodies of women and 
girls and what is done to them. Over the last five years, such interaction with individual 
women, work with the World Council of Churches on a gender violence project, and 
broadening the scope of my reading, has led me to ‘hear’ (mostly through written 
accounts), of the experiences of many women of different, races, classes, nationalities, and 
religions, who have suffered abuse at the hands of husbands and male partners. Evidence 
from these personal encounters, supports the contention of those who work in this field, 
that such violence against women is no respecter of class, racial or other boundaries. A 
study by Lesley Orr has ably demonstrated that such ‘domestic abuse’ affects women who 
belong to Christian communities in Scotland (Orr 2000). As a minister in the Church of 
Scotland this is an issue that is, for me, literally close to home.
Such testimony as Î have encountered, has stirred empathy and questioning. Ï find myself 
asking if this is particularly intense because I also have a body of a woman, which leads me
 ^My initial understanding o f the word ‘sacred’ is drawn fi oin the work o f Emile Durklieim. He writes o f it as 
that which is set apart (Diirkheim tl953b:70 in Pickering 1984: 126), that which society holds in its highest 
esteem which is not to be challenged or desecrated. I also draw from Durkheim the understanding that the 
sacred is created and held in place by society. In his classic work Elementary Forms o f  Religious Life 
tl915(1912), Durklieim spoke o f the sacred character o f  something being superadded or superimposed upon 
it (tl915d;229, in Pickering 1984:131). Durkheim writes in an article on the dualism o f human nature. ‘
Sacred things are simply collective ideals that have fixed themselves on material objects’ (Durkheim 
tl960c:335 in Pickering 1984:131). In his dichotomy of the sacred and the profane, human bodies, and 
everything related to the body, fell, for Durkheim into the categoiy o f  the profane (Durkheim tl960c:334, in 
Pickering 1984:134). In this dissertation I seek the possibility o f  a re-visioning that could inscribe bodies, 
including women’s bodies as sacred, in terms o f  one o f the definitions in the Oxford English Dictionary, as 
sacrosanct and inviolable.
My concentration on bodies in this study, does not mean that I am unaware that emotional abuse is profoundly 
damaging. My concern is to focus on a re-valuing o f bodies which could have implications across the whole 
spectrum o f abuse.
to experience a shared identity with other women, beyond simply that of a shared humanity. 
The experience of this testimony also stirs a strong desire that this situation should change 
and a need to understand how such change might happen. It raises the question of what 
agency do those in such situations of oppression have to bring about change, both for 
themselves in their individual circumstances, and on a social/cultural level. Where such 
agency appears to be lacking, where it is hard for those who suffer to be heard or seen, is 
there role for advocacy by others on their behalf?
While I am aware that increasing provision is being made, especially here in Scotland, to 
help women to become survivors rather than victims of such abuse, and that ministers and 
church communities may offer sanctuary and pastoral support, I have begun to ask if real 
change in this situation might not require a re-valuing of women’s bodies within culture. I 
have provisionally used the tenu ‘sacred’ bodies to describe the ‘horizon’^  that I would 
seek in this respect, although part of my task in this study will be to explore the 
appropriateness of this term.
As a woman brought up in the Christian faith, trained in Christian ministry who belongs to 
a worshipping Christian congregation, I also have a strong interest in the relationship of 
religion - religious beliefs, practice and religious symbols - to culture and to issues of 
power, and agency. Working, principally, as I do, within Christian faith communities I 
would want to question the role of religious symbolism as itself part of a discourse, or a 
number of discourses, which either underpin or challenge the status quo. A key question 
for me is what part can religious symbol systems play in social transformation? Do women 
have a different relationship to such symbol systems from men, and if so is this difference 
linked to their different embodiment? Do women, as has been claimed, (hooks 1984: in 
Taylor 1990) have a double perspective, able to inhabit the ‘given’ dominant position and 
simultaneously have a view from the margins? ^
 ^My use o f ‘horizon’ is drawn from Grace Jantzen’s hook Becoming Divine, 1998.
This point will be expanded on in the discussion o f  standpoint epistemology on pp. 35-41.
In her book Transgressive Corporeality (1995), Prosser MacDonald, claims that for 
Nietzsche, ‘ the form of the will-to-truth which seeks a truth that is constant, unitary and 
universal attains this truth only through a violation of that which changes, is non-unitary 
and particular’(1995:22). She goes on to say, ‘Traditional metaphysics is both a violator of 
the body and a covering over or mystification of this violation’(1995:23). As I have 
indicated, I am concerned with the fate of bodies, bodies which, whatever else they are, are 
changing, non unitary and always particular. This work is informed by an understanding 
that, historically, in the Christian church (as in the secular world), such violence to, and 
violation of bodies, inherent in the traditional metaphysics, has been written in a particular 
way on the bodies of women. I suggest this has been so, in part, because women have been 
constructed as the body side of a body /spirit dualism that has held sway (Graham 1995:11- 
16). It is my contention that the embodied experience of women has, in the past, often been 
suppressed and devalued or co-opted into economies of domination to serve as the ‘other’ 
over against which the normative ‘male’ is constructed. One question that I pursue is 
‘What is the relationship of this embodied experience to religious practice and 
contemporary understanding of the sacred?’ As feminist theology continues to raise 
awareness of these issues, can previously suppressed or ignored, lived experience of 
women become increasingly visible or audible within the church, in the realms of theology 
and liturgy, and offer its own revelation of the sacred? If this is possible could it lead, in a 
reflexive, chiasmic action, to a greater sacralisation of bodies and a challenge to economies 
of domination dependant on violence, without creating a dominant and dominating 
hegemony of its own?
Pursuing answers to these questions, in Chapter 1 ,1 will explore the work of a number of 
writers who place bodies at the centre of their theories, to see what understandings and 
interpretations they might offer of bodies, particularly those of women. I wish to discover 
if their theories shed any light on how the experiences of women, especially those who 
suffer abuse, might be heard, and how social change that could lessen or prevent such 
abuse, might be brought about.
In this study I intend to talk to and listen to ‘ordinary women’ to hear something of their 
experiences of their bodies in everyday life and in their religious context. In Chapter 2, 
therefore, alert to the problems of describing an area of human experience as the 
‘experiences of women’, especially in the light of recent thinking on identity and 
epistemology, I will address some of the current debates concerning claims for experiential 
knowledge.
Chapter 3 offers an account of my research strategy. Having a concern that this be 
conducted according to the developing principles of feminist research, at the beginning of 
the chapter I outline some key characteristics of feminist research methodology and go on 
to show how these are present in the methods that I employ.
Chapter 4 is an account of the findings of this research, and this is followed by a 
conclusion, which includes suggestions for future directions in which such a project might 
develop.
Although motivated by a concern for the bodies of women damaged by violence, it is 
apparent that in a study of this scale it is not possible to explore in depth any relationship 
between how women’s bodies are perceived by themselves and others, and the existence of 
widespread and endemic violence against women. This study will be limited to hearing 
some women’s expression of their own understanding of their bodies, within daily life and 
in their worship experience, to attempting to uncover what has shaped and continues to 
shape such understandings, and to seeking their response to the suggestion that bodies 
might be re-visioned as sacred.
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Chapter 1 
lo  search of real bodies
‘(T)he body has a way of bleeding through even the thickest of conceptual overlays’ 
(O’Donovan-Anderson 1996:3)
Michael O’Donovan-Anderson’s statement highlights one of the main issues at the heart of 
contemporary studies of ‘the body’. A central question is, is there an essential ‘body’ of 
any sort that becomes overlaid with theories or concepts, but still makes itself known to us 
by ‘bleeding through’. If there is how do we recognise it? Or, is the body only visible, 
comprehensible, describable, because it has been constructed, layered, sedimented, or cast 
by discourse, into a certain form?
It has been rightly claimed that ‘there is no consensus on what the body is and what 
constitutes it’(Cream 1994:32 in Holliday and Hassard 2001:2). Views on this matter range 
between those that claim that knowledge of the body is entirely created through discourse, 
and on the other hand, those who hold to the body as a pre-discursive given. Many writers 
hold quite a nuanced view, allowing for the body’s materiality, while seeing it as acting as 
an interface with culture. As Lois McNay, in her discussion of gender and agency would 
have it, ‘As a point of overlap between the physical, the symbolic and the sociological, the 
body is a dynamic mutable frontier’ (McNay 2000:32). Or again, as expressed by Meleau- 
Ponty, ‘Everything is both manufactured and natural in man (sic)’(Merleau-Ponty 
1962:189). Given this range of theoretical approach, and trying to fix ‘real’ bodies as 
objects of thought, other questions may be: which theoretical approach to understanding the 
body proves most enlightening or indeed emancipatory for those whose bodies are 
suffering, and which offers most hope of a different future, with greater agency for the 
individual subject?
My interest here, in terms of my search for ‘sacred’ bodies, lies in the possibility that if 
bodies are socially constructed then there may be scope for them to be re-constructed as
nmore sacred and less vulnerable to abuse/ Can there be a re-visioning of women’s bodies 
in their materiality or their cultural construction which establishes them as precious, rather 
than frightening and in need of control and containment?
Exploring this question Ï will look briefly at some aspects of the work of Michel Foucault 
and Judith Butler who have stressed a representational (i.e. social constructionist) 
understanding of the body. I will ask if these writers, in fact, offer insights about the body 
rather than from  the body. In an attempt to engage with the lived body, I will explore an 
experiential (existential/phenomenological) perspective, engaging with the work of 
Merleau-Ponty. Even in the work of such an existentialist writer, real bodies may still 
evade us, therefore, I intend to explore the contribution of John D Caputo as he wrestles 
with a ‘post-ethical’ response to the suffering ‘Other’, and will examine his distinction 
between the body and flesh. His work points also to the work of Elaine Scany on the body 
in pain, which has relevance for this exploration. Finally, I wish to look to the writing of 
Julia Kristeva particularly her work on ‘abjection’ and her model for ethical behaviour 
drawn from the maternal body.
As already acknowledged, this is a slippery subject, and in order to have some ‘real’ human 
bodies at the centre of my thinking, I will bring the theories I encounter into dialogue with 
the documented experiences of a specific group of women, the so-called Korean ‘comfort 
women’.
The ‘comfort women’
In December 1991, three elderly South Korean women filed a lawsuit against the Japanese 
government, claiming systematic enslavement and abuse as a result of their treatment at the 
hands of the Imperial Army during World War Two. As their case unfolded, and women’s 
groups took up their cause, the full scale of their story emerged. It was revealed that as 
many as 200,000 young women (mostly 14-18 year olds) from South-East Asia, especially 
Korea, were forcibly conscripted by the Japanese forces and drafted to work as sex-slaves
 ^ ‘ What is socially constmcted can be deconstructed and reconstructed through deconstruction and 
reconstruction o f language itse lf (Cooey 1994:26).
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throughout South-East Asia and the Pacific during the 1930s and up to 1945. This was a 
deliberate Imperial Army policy, aimed at preventing the spread of venereal disease among 
the troops (hence the young age of the girls), and at preventing the soldiers from 
committing sexual crimes in the areas where they were fighting. Corralled in small 
cubicles, the women were required to have sex with as many as thirty men a day. At the 
end of the war some of these women overwhelmed by shame, took their own lives, others 
found it impossible to return home, while yet others lived for years in poverty, suffering 
physically and mentally from their ordeal. The plight of these so called ‘comfort women’ 
was subsequently suppressed for nearly fifty years, preventing the women from making 
public their experience. A key factor in the eventual surfacing of the ‘comfort women’s’ 
story was the involvement of Korean and other campaigning feminists, originally 
concerned with the issue of sex tourism in Korea.
As well as the abuse and damage done to these young women, the aspect of their story that 
stands out, is the time that it took for their experiences to surface, which raises questions as 
to why this should be so. Elaine Graham claims that in the case of the ‘comfort women’, 
‘strong structural factors were at work which created a culture of silence...cultural factors 
predisposed the ‘comfort women’ to a life of “abjection”, because their experiences 
inscribed on their suffering bodies transgressed too many cultural taboos’ (Graham 
unpub; 15). She points out that theirs was a culture built on elaborate observations of 
honour, shame and social status, which were carried and embodied in women’s bodies. 
The passage into speech of the stories of the surviving comfort women was always, already 
circumscribed by the concealed dynamics of gender and race. They could not be heard 
until major cultural shifts began to take place in South East Asia (Graham unpub: 18).
Michel Foucault
With the story of the comfort women as a ‘conversation partner’, I turn to the work of 
Michel Foucault. Foucault has described his work as constituting a ‘history of bodies’ and 
the manner in which what is most vital in them has been invested (Foucault 1981:152). 
The body has been central to Foucault’s account of the relation between power and
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knowledge, with his focus being on the body as discursively ordered. His interest has lain 
in the way bodies are disciplined, and in mapping the relation between the “body” and the 
effects of power. He claims that ‘The body is moulded by a great many distinct regimes’ 
(Foucault 1971:153 in Hancock et al [eds.] 2000). Also that it is an outcome of the play of 
power and power ‘reaches into the very grain of individuals, touches their bodies and 
inserts itself into their actions and attitudes, their discourses, learning processes and 
everyday lives’ (Foucault 1978:39 in Hancock et al [eds.] 2000).
In his 1979 [1975] work Discipline and Punish; Foucault examined the transition in the 18^ *' 
and 19^*^  centuries from control by punishments and torture of the body, to control by 
incarceration and discipline by surveillance. Under such penal practice the body was, 
according to Foucault rendered ‘docile’. In this analysis it is suggested that the body was 
transformed by a whole machinery of power, and the emphasis is put on the body’s 
malleability. Prison was just one part of a caceral net spread throughout social institutions 
and disciplinary mechanisms.
In his later work Foucault refined his understanding of the operation of power. He moved 
beyond his understanding of disciplined bodies as simply ‘docile bodies’. Extrapolating
from his work on ethics as practised in classical Greece and Rome he suggested that
technologies of domination may be balanced by ‘technologies of se lf’.
‘Technologies of self which permit individuals to effect by their 
own means or with the help of others a certain number of 
operations on their bodies and souls, thoughts and conduct and 
way of being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain 
a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection or immortality’
(Foucault 1988:18).
This gives the sense that virtuous existence may be accomplished by an exquisite life 
performance. He implies that the self is not given to us but that ‘we have to create 
ourselves as a work of art’ (Foucault 1986:351, in McNay 1994:146). When such aesthetic
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practices are advocated as a form of contemporary ethics, McNay points out that this is 
seen by some critics as a project for privileged minorities, liberated from all functions in the 
material reproduction of society -  little more than a celebration of ‘public school virtues’ 
(McNay 1994:146-147). McNay allows that Foucault’s concern is with grounding notions 
of creativity and aesthetics, removing them from the sphere of ‘high art’ (McNay 
1994:147). It is a reclaiming of aesthetics designed to reactivate a kind of imaginative 
utopianism.
Glancing again at the bodies of the ‘comfort women’ it is possible to see them, to some 
degree, in terms of Foucault’s initial ‘docile body’ paradigm, both in their original kidnap 
and abuse and in their silenced post-war existence when shame immobilised them and left 
them unable to speak or seek justice. The ‘comfort women’ could be seen to have been 
shaped by discourses of power, by surveillance, both external and internal to themselves, 
into ‘docile bodies’. The expectations of their own culture and cultural understandings of 
masculinity and femininity, which I will elaborate on, served to leave them little scope for 
resistance or self-determination. Having been abused, they were silenced by their shame, 
illustrating Foucault’s understanding of the normalising nature of internalised disciplinary 
power.
One aspect of Foucault’s later thinking is his understanding of the impersonal, all 
pervading, nature of power that by its very nature implies resistance. He proposed that 
resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power, rather it is more like the 
opposite: states of power are continually engendered or incited on account of the potential 
counter powers which co-exist with them. He claims that power can only be exercised over 
‘free subjects and only in so far as they are free’ (Foucault 1982:221 in Sawicki 1991:25). 
For Foucault resistance is more effective when it is directed at a technique of power rather 
than at power in general. Resistance consists in refusing the techniques that allow for the 
exercise of power.
Set against Foucault’s later work, and an understanding of resistance being present where 
techniques of power are in operation, it would seem that the ‘comfort women’ once
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installed by the Japanese army in comfort stations had little scope for developing such 
resistance, the situation being rather one of the creation of ‘docile bodies’ as in Foucault’s 
earlier understanding.
Nonetheless, it is the case, that there was the possibility of resistance to a limited degree for 
some of the ‘comfort women’. It was possible for some to overcome their conditioning to 
regard them selves as worthless damaged goods. One who resisted in this way was Soo- 
Bock. We read of her, ‘ After many days of despair and crying, Soo-Bock determined that 
she would survive. She could not die like a dog in a strange land. She started to eat as 
much as she could, and she also became very obedient’(Hyun Kyung 1996: 132). For many 
of the women, however, the experience was too damaging and their cultural conditioning 
was too strong. At the end of the war they took their own lives or lived in shamed 
obscurity. For the most part, it was only when an alternative reading of their experience 
was offered by outside agencies that some could take some limited control over their lives, 
and begin to practice what might be identified as ‘technologies of self. Again we hear of 
Soo-Bock. When trying to rebuild her life after the war, she ‘was determined to bring her 
own beautiful lotus flower of life to bloom out of her muddy past’(Hyun Kyung 1996:132).
Foucault, whose work over time, thus offers a range of understandings of the operation of 
power and resistance, has been taken to task for his extreme reluctance to attribute explicit 
agency to subjects in his early account of power, portraying individuals as passive bodies, 
constituted by power and immobilised in a discourse of discipline (McNay 1994:100-104, 
2000:8). However, his description of the creation of docile bodies does seem in many ways 
an accurate one for the state that the ‘comfort women’ found themselves in, one in which 
their own agency was very limited.
Foucault’s work on the creation of ‘docile bodies’ has been amended and employed, not 
without some questioning, by some feminist writers. For example Sandra Bartky has used 
Foucault’s concept of the operation of power in her analyses of the fashion and beauty 
regimes in contemporary USA. Bartky describes the internalization by women, of practices 
and understandings of femininity that reinforce the very power relations that oppress them
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(in Alien 1996 in Hekman (ed.) 1996:275). This will be a theme that emerges in the 
conversations of women who participated in this research.
Judith Butler
Judith Butler is influenced strongly by Foucault and in her work emphasises the constituted 
nature of corporeality. Butler is aware of the problems that post-structural analyses, such as 
her own, pose for those who would see the importance of agency for gendered bodies. She 
has said ‘One hears warnings like the following: If everything is discourse, what happens to 
the body? If everything is text, what about violence and bodily injury’? (Butler 1993:28)
Focusing on understandings of sex and gender, Butler claims that while sexual difference is 
often evoked as an issue of material differences, it is ‘never simply a function of material 
differences which are not in some way both marked and formed by discursive practices’ 
(Butler 1993:1). She makes clear that this is not to say that discourses cause sexual 
difference. Butler claims that the category of ‘sex’ is normative, what Foucault has called a 
‘regulatory ideal’. This has the power to produce -  demarcate, circulate, differentiate ~ the 
bodies it controls (Butler 1993:1). However Butler would also claim that the 
materialization of this ideal construct of ‘sex’ is never quite complete ‘bodies never quite 
comply with the norms by which their materialization is impelled’(Butler 1993:2). This 
can then open possibilities for a process of rematerialization, whereby ‘the force of the 
regulatory law, turned against itself can spawn rearticulations that call into question the 
hegemonic force of that very regulatory law’(Butler 1993:2). ‘Techniques’ by which such 
rematerializations might be achieved, involve performance and parody. Butler does not, as 
some have accused her of doing deny the materiality of the body ‘what constitutes the fixity 
of the body, its contours, its movements, will be fully material, but materiality will be 
rethought as the effect of power.. .’(Butler 1993:2).
When considering the application of Butler’s work to bodies experiencing suffering, it may 
be her understanding of those who fall outside the sexed identifications that the hetero­
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sexual imperative enables via discursive means, that is significant. She would claim that 
the establishment of this exclusionary matrix by which subjects are formed requires the 
simultaneous production of a domain of abject beings, those who are not yet ‘subjects’ but 
who form the constitutive outside of the domain of the subject. ‘ The abject designates here 
precisely those ‘unlivable’ and ‘unihabitable’ zones of social life which are nevertheless 
densely populated by those who do not enjoy the status of subject, but whose living under 
the sign of the ‘unlivable’ is required to circumscribe the domain of the subject’ (Butler 
1993:3). Butler would claim that the task of feminist theory is ‘ to refigure this necessary 
outside as a future horizon, one in which the violence of exclusion is perpetually in the 
process of being overcome’ (Butler 1993:53).
Under this analysis the ‘comfort women’ would appear to have been placed outside the 
domain of the subject, the construction of masculinity within their own culture requiring a 
double construction of unmarried women as either virgin or whore, with neither category 
being the subjects of their own lives; leaving men the only true subjects with their own 
agency in that culture. After the war, the'comfort women’ were truly in an abject realm, no 
longer sex slaves, but unable to return home as respectable women. We might ask whether 
their experience challenged their society’s existing discourse on gender. Did their outside 
position (neither virgin, unsullied wife or whore), become a ‘future horizon’ as Butler 
suggests? Perhaps the work done in campaigning on their behalf could be seen as a 
beginning of that process.
Soh (Soh:2000:4-5) claims that masculinist sexual culture permeated the traditional cultures 
of Japan and Korea. She uses this term masculinist to refer to those men and women who 
believe in the Confucian principle of male superiority and in male ‘sex rights’, that is, for 
men to have access to the female body both inside and outside marriage. This led to what 
Soh calls a masculinist double standard for sexual conduct, wherein women were/are 
socialised to regard loss of virginity as a shameful condition deserving social ostracism. 
Raised in this culture the ‘comfort women’ were conditioned to regard the preservation of 
sexual purity being as important as life itself. Thus they carefully hid their ordeal as 
‘comfort women’ for fear of social stigma and ostracisation. Within this masculinist
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culture women were classified into two types according to the main functions of their 
sexuality: women to many for procreation and women to hire for recreation. While men 
could engage in sexual recreation under the state-run system of kisaeng, traditionally 
women’s sexuality was rigidly controlled by means of the cult of virginity/chastity. 
Regardless of the individual circumstances, women who lost their virginity outside 
marriage, or who were not chaste within it, were considered sullied, and made to feel 
ashamed. Following their ordeal, the ‘comfort women’ could no longer embody the 
acceptable face of female gender in their society, that of virgin or respectable wife and 
there seems to have been little space to subvert or re-articulate their place as women in that 
society. They had performed their gender as whores, albeit forced ones and they were left 
with this construction of their gendered identity. They could not re-enter respectable society 
because of immobilising, silencing shame.
Engaging with Butler’s understanding of bodies, and with a concern for the bodies of 
abused women, I note McNay’s insight that in many ways Butler replicates what McNay 
sees as Foucault’s failure to integrate a theory of agency with an understanding of the 
disciplinary inscription of the body. McNay would claim that Butler fails to connect the 
symbolic construction of the body to other material relations in which the process takes 
place (McNay 2000:35).
Maurice Merleau-Pontv
For an existential approach to the body, I turn now to the work of French phenomenologist 
philosopher Merleau-Ponty. Phenomenology is a 20*^  century philosophical movement 
dedicated to describing the structures of experience as they present themselves to 
consciousness, without recourse to theory, deduction or assumptions from other disciplines 
such as the natural sciences. The phenomenological method is one of description, designed 
to reawaken the primordial experience underlying all our reconstructions of the world. One 
question with regard this quest to hear and validate the experience of women, particularly 
those who suffer abuse, is whether such phenomenology, such description, can 
meaningfully portray women’s experience.
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For Merleau-Ponty all knowledge takes place within horizons opened up by perception. Fie 
took phenomenology ’ s concern to be with the pre-reflective world, which is the 
background of all reflection, Merleau-Ponty stressed the role of the active, involved body 
in all human knowledge. He wanted to pursue a genuinely concrete philosophy and saw a 
focus on the actual human situation as the starting point for any authentic philosophy. He 
questioned the value of scientific thinking, ‘ a thinking which looks on from above, and 
thinks of the object-in-general, must return to the ‘there is’ which underlies it; to the site, 
the soil of the sensible and opened world such as it is in our life and for our body....that 
actual body I call mine....Further associated bodies must be brought forward along with 
my body...’(Merleau-Ponty 1964:160-161 in Langer 1989:xi).
In the place of traditional approaches to the body, Langer in her commentary on Merleau- 
Ponty’s major work Phenomenology o f Perception 1962 [1945], suggests that he proposes 
that the body is ‘ a dynamic synthesis of intentionalities which by responding to the world’s 
solicitations, brings perceptual structures into being in a ceaseless dialectic whereby both 
body and objects are constituted as such’ (Langer 1989:149). Wliat would this mean for the 
culturally immobilised, kidnapped and raped ‘comfort women’? Does this express the 
possibility of some kind of agency and choice for the lived body? Is this another version of 
Foucault’s ‘technologies of self or Butler’s performance and parody?
Merleau-Ponty appears to have a rather attractive but utopian understanding of the 
relationship between the ‘I’ and the ‘Other’. For him other people are not inaccessible 
minds incomprehensibly inhabiting impenetrable mechanisms whose functioning induces 
us to infer the existence of subjectivities confronting our own, rather for Merleau-Ponty, 
there is a direct pre-reflective communication of body subjects sharing a perceptual field. 
Again, as interpreted by Langer, Merleau-Ponty suggests that we are, ‘primordially o f  the 
natural world and therefore fundamentally at home in it: that we similarly share a pre- 
reflective bond with others and the human world; that by our daily lives we participate in 
shaping our world and determining the course of our joint history; that our commitments 
are never completely unsupported since our freedom is always interwoven with that of
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other people’ (Langer 1989:152-153). She goes on to claim that for Merleau-Ponty ‘ A 
fundamental mutual comprehension thus subtends any subsequent misunderstandings, so 
that our basic relations with others are not ones of confrontation but of co-operation. Prior 
to any refusal of others, our bodily being establishes a pre-personal unity with them; and it 
is in virtue of this unity that selfhood can develop at all’ (Langer 1989:151-154). In a close 
reading of The Visible and the Invisible Langer suggest that Merleau-Ponty saw the 
encounter between ‘us’ and ‘what is’ as one of presence in which our very openness upon 
what is, testifies to our primordial bond with it and brings to light a common ‘flesh’
‘... .my body is made of the same flesh as the world (it is a perceived) and moreover 
that this flesh of my body is shared by the world, the world, reflects it encroaches 
upon it and it encroaches upon the world (the felt {senti\ at the same time the 
culmination of subjectivity and the culmination of materiality), they are in a relation 
of transgression or overlapping....This also means: my body is not only one 
perceived among others, it is the measurant of all, Nullpunkt of all the dimensions 
of the world’(Merleau-Ponty 1968 (1964):248-249).
In his later work The Visible and the Invisible, Merleau-Ponty saw the divergence of ‘my 
body’ from ‘the other’s’ as a difference that is discovered rather than projected. As he 
understands the link with ‘the other’.
‘My body is not given to me as a sum of sensations but as a whole. A form, which 
is both common to both visual and tactile perceptions, is the link between the other 
person’s body and my own. The two bodies can therefore communicate through the 
different perceptions. Everything transpires as if the other person’s intuitions and 
motor realizations existed in a sort of relation of internal encroachment, as if my 
body and the body of the other person together formed a system’(Merleau-Ponty 
1982:52 in Dillon 1990:21).
and again, ... there is already a kind of presence of other people in me’ (Merleau-Ponty 
1982: 56 in Dillon 1990:21). He drew an analogy between the system that unifies an
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individual body and that which joins individual bodies in the world. ‘The hiatus between 
the hand that touches and the hand touched is spanned by the total being of my body as the 
separation of my body and the other’s is spanned by the total being of the world’ (Merleau- 
Ponty 1968 (1964): 148). However, at the same time, he can be interpreted as saying, ‘ 
there is a perceptual presentation of the other that includes his opacity, his recalcitrance, the 
recesses of his being that I am finally unable to penetrate, in short his ineffable 
transcendence’(Dillon 1990:23).
For Merleau-Ponty, when regarding the ‘Other’ there are original differentiations but they 
are of a unitary world that functions as a common domain to allow the exchanges and 
transgressions of reversibility to take place. As paraphrased by (Dillon 1990:23-24) he 
says, ‘I can take up the space occupied by the other and see the world from that vantage 
because we dwell in the same world. This reversibility of position allows us to move 
toward a common ground, but ultimately because I cannot live in his (sic) body, I can only 
approximate his experience.’
The question of whether we discover the otherness of ‘the Other’ or project our own 
difference onto them will, of course, have a bearing on how we respond to others, and is 
relevant to a consideration of what understandings of our common bodily life are helpful to 
those who suffer. With regard to the work of Merleau-Ponty, he does suggest ways in 
which one body might be linked to and respond to another, but the critique of his 
understanding by Caputo that follows raises some relevant questions. As has been the case 
with many before and since, the Japanese Imperial Army, in their abuse of the ‘comfort 
women’ did not appear to perceive this unity of existence claimed by Merleau-Ponty, which 
allows us to see the world from the vantage point of the other, or if they did their behaviour 
was not shaped by such a perception.
John D Caputo
As we come to the work of John Caputo, who is concerned with ‘disasters’, where bodies 
are reduced to abject ‘flesh’, and remembering again the ‘comfort women’, we might 
reflect sombrely on Merleau-Ponty’s assertion that we share one flesh and what that might
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mean to us. In his book fluent and fascinating book, Against Ethics (1993), Caputo sets a 
‘Greek’ rational philosophical way of thinking and being, over against what he calls 
‘jewgreek’ engagement with the world. He takes Merleau-Ponty to task over the 
appropriateness of his phenomenological observations. While finding much that is 
appealing in phenomenology, he contends that Philosophy’s ‘body’ is ‘an active, athletic, 
healthy, erect, white male body, sexually able and unambiguously gendered, well-born, 
well-bred and well buried’ (Caputo 1993:194). Over against this, Caputo’s concern is to 
engage with the bodies which he says have always fallen before phenomenology’s epoche, 
that is the disfigured, diseased, unburied, sacrificial and ashen bodies, and with responding 
to them with what he calls a poetics of obligation ‘For the poetics of obligation sides 
with disastrous, disfigured, ill-formed, ill-fated, star-crossed, damaged bodies -everything 
that the discourses call flesh’ (Caputo 1993: 194-195). Even as phenomenology professes 
to deal with the stuff of everyday life, for Caputo it favours ‘a proper body, a body with 
propriety and decorum, dignity and grace (with just a touch of tan)’(Caputo 1993:194).
It might be argued in his defence, that Merleau-Ponty has a damaged body at the heart of 
his major work Phenomenology o f  Perception in the case study of Schneider, suffering as 
he is from a head injury, but Caputo claims that the unfortunate Schneider is treated with a 
distancing eye by the phenomenological ‘we’. ‘Peering through the unidirectional glass of 
a philosophical reduction, we find that Schneider is he who is not like us but tells us who 
‘we’ are’ (Caputo 1993:195).There are echoes here of construction of the subject through 
one who is not like us, as in the realm of Butler’s ‘abject’ .^
Caputo goes on to outline what for him is the distinction between body, the agent body of 
philosophy, and the antiphlosophical category of ‘flesh’, which is a sphere of disfigured 
bodies, bodies in pain or laid low. As we understood from the writing of Merleau-Ponty, 
the ‘body’ is the transitive operation of intentional life, an active well organized agent that 
is borne into the world by the organization of its intentional operations. (Caputo 1993:203).
 ^For Caputo ‘ Obligation is a feeling, the feeling o f being bound Something that demands my
response... All that I know about... obligation is that I am taken hold o f from without, seized by something 
else, something other’ (Caputo 1993:7-8).
’ See pp.16-17.
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Merleau-Ponty’s body-subject, this transitive agent body is carried beyond itself and buries 
itself in the world of its concerns - very Greek and very philosophic. ïn contrast, jewgreek 
bodies are disasters -lacking transcendence and transitivity, their intentional lines are 
jammed, their transcendence blunted, clogged, shut down — reduced to flesh (Caputo 
1993:203). Caputo goes on to detail how flesh is not the site of being and sense as found in 
the work of Merleau-Ponty but rather it is the scene of a tearing asunder. Flesh is what 
happens to a body that is stripped of being and sense, that suffers the violent loss of its 
world. ^
What Caputo (1993:201) calls the poetics of obligation turns on this ineradicable exposure, 
this quasi-transcendental vulnerability, the exposure to wounding, destruction and 
consumption that for him defines the figure of flesh. Caputo points out that Merleau-Ponty 
has a philosophy of flesh, and a beautiful philosophy of reversibility. Flesh for Merleau- 
Ponty is the chiasm, the inteitwining of the visible and the invisible, the place where Being 
folds back upon itself, invaginates, turns itself inside out and thus allows itself to appear as 
visible (Caputo 1993:201). The ‘invisible’ life of seeing, hearing, touching, the whole 
ensemble of sentient life, cannot be deployed except from the site of a being which is itself 
visible, audible, sensible. Caputo recognises that for Merleau-Ponty, the visible world and 
the eye share a common flesh; the flesh is their common being and belonging together 
(Caputo 1993:201).
For Caputo this will not do, it is too devoted to seeing and perception, visibility and 
invisibility - too much an ocular phenomena that moves within the range of light (Caputo 
1993:202). It is too taken up with an encompassing intertwining that ties everything 
together into an ontological totality. Caputo sees Merleau-Ponty’s view as a form of 
idealism, (we noted its utopian quality), that takes the measure of the flesh in terms of light 
and opening. Post-holocaust, Caputo is remembering human ashes, cinders that for him 
make for obligation. For him, Merleau-Ponty’s chiasmic intertwining has too little to do 
with ÛQshlFleisch and ashen hair (Caputo 1993:202). Caputo’s ‘flesh’ is not the body of 
Merleau-Ponty’s reversibilities, seeing and being seen, touching and being touched, but
See discussion o f Scarry below.
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rather it is involved in the more visceral reversibility of eating and being eaten. It is this 
disastrous and disordered flesh that Caputo sees as the site of obligation.
Elaine Scarry
I pause to expand on a point that Caputo makes in his work with the use Elaine Scarry’s 
analysis of the operation of pain on the agency of the body. She does appear to work from 
an understanding of a material, sentient body. She speaks of ‘the sheer material factualness 
of the human body’ (Scarry 1985:14). In her classic exploration of The Body in Pain 
(1985), Scarry points to the fact that ‘pain comes unshareably into our midst, as at once that 
which cannot be denied and that which cannot be confirmed’ (Scarry 1985:4). She points 
out that the person in pain has certainty regarding that pain and the intensity of it, another 
person hearing of that pain, has doubt. Even when the felt attributes of pain are able to be 
lifted into the visible world, only if the referent for these now objectified attributes remains 
the human body, does the sentient fact of a person’s suffering become knowable to a 
second person (Scarry 1985:13). It is possible according to Scany, for the felt- 
characteristics of pain, its ‘incontestable reality to the sufferer, its certainty, to be 
appropriated away from the body and presented as the attributes of something else’ (Scarry 
1985:13).
Scarry writes of ‘the way we make ourselves (and the originally interior facts of sentience) 
available to one another through verbal and material artefacts.’ (Scarry 1985:22). She 
claims ‘What is quite literally at stake in the body in pain is the making and unmaking of 
the world’ (Scarry 1985:23), For Scarry, physical pain not only resists language but 
destroys it, in fact it destroys the world of the victim. It narrows that world to just the 
body. If severe enough it plunges the sufferer into a state anterior to language, where they 
can only utter pre-linguistic sounds and cries (Scarry 1985:4). This is demonstrated most 
clearly in Scarry’s discussion of torture. She claims that torture destroys the world of the 
victim, that under such treatment the victims world becomes merely his or her body, as 
indeed she says it does for those near death. She says, ‘ the created world of thought and 
feeling, all the psychological and mental content that constitutes both one’s self and one’s
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world, and that gives rise to and is in turn made possible by language, ceases to exist’ 
(Scarry 1985:30).
Scarry sees a link between this difficulty in verbally representing pain and political agency, 
claiming, ‘The problem of pain is bound up with the problem of power’ (Scarry 1985: 12). 
Infliction of pain can be described in such a way as to deflect understanding and 
communication. For instance torture can be called ‘intelligence gathering’. The word 
‘injuring’ is usually absent from strategic and political descriptions of war (Scarry 1985:12- 
13). Giving victims of a system of mass forced sexual slavery and rape the title ‘comfort 
women’ would seem to be a use of language which offers a similar deflection.
While those in acute pain have little or no voice or agency according to Scarry, ‘an act of 
human contact and concern, ... provides the hurt person with worldly self-extension: in 
acknowledging and expressing another person’s pain, or in articulating one of his non 
bodily concerns while he is unable to, one human being who is well and freely willing turns 
himself into an image of the others psychic or sentient claims, an image existing in the 
space outside the sufferer’s body, projected out into the world and held there intact by that 
persons powers, until the sufferer himself regains his own powers of self extension. By 
holding that world in place, or by giving the pain a place in the world, sympathy lessens the 
power of sickness and pain’ (Scarry 1985:50). Ultimately, Scarry would say that restoration 
of voice can lessen the power of pain, and we might hope that this proved to be the case for 
some of the ‘comfort women’.
Recalling after this flow of words, the bodies, or would we say, following Caputo, the 
abused ‘flesh’, of the young ‘comfort women’, we might ask if a poetics of obligation is the 
only response we might make to their suffering. Caputo does not assure us that even a 
poetics of obligation is necessarily the outcome of an engagement with such suffering 
bodies. While asserting that flesh, the body in dissolution and pain, is the site of such 
obligation he offers no certainties.
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Caputo's vivid raising up of flesh before our mind’s eye makes us look where we would 
perhaps rather not. His poetics of obligation traces a connection to the other that he claims 
originates from flesh itself. While this poetics of obligation may be a response drawn from 
us by a body reduced to flesh, Caputo cannot give us assurances that this might be a 
strategy to prevent further ‘disasters’. He states that, ‘such claims as afflicted flesh make 
upon us are frail and finite and my supplementai^y poetic strategy is to lend these claims an 
ear, to provide them with an idiom, to magnify their voice, to let them ring like bells across 
the surface of our lives, and to discourage cruelty. After that I do not know what else to 
do’ {my emphasis) (Caputo 1993:209). There appear to be no guarantees ‘We have to do 
with competing poetics, poetics of obligation and poetics of phallo-aggressive machismo, 
with the persuasive power of competing poetics’ '(Caputo 1993:209). Indeed, Caputo 
admits, disturbingly, that ‘the flesh of the Other is no less what triggers my blow....The 
flesh of the Other is never neutral...The irreducibility of flesh, of the signals that it sends 
forth is why obligation keeps happening, why it cannot be put out of action.’(Caputo 
1993:215)
The question this raises on behalf of those whose bodies might potentially suffer violence 
and endure pain at the hands of another, is what prompts either the caress or the blow? 
What is there about our understanding and construction of bodies that shapes the response 
between one body and another? Could bodies, all bodies, be understood and constructed 
within cultures as more sacred and thus less vulnerable to abuse?
Julia Kristeva
As I continue this search for sacred bodies among those who theorise about the body, I 
review some aspects of the work of Julia Kr isteva, one of the so-called ‘French feminists’ 
and especially her thinking on ‘abjection’ and her offering of a model for ethical behaviour, 
drawn from the maternal body.
Looking to the violent treatment of the ‘comfort women’ who one might say were treated 
like dirt, Kristeva offers an interpretation for such interpersonal violence, in her exploration
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of ‘abjection’. For Kristeva it seems that abjection is the founding moment for all of us as 
subjects. This moment marks the beginnings of separation from the undifferentiated 
relationship previously experienced with the mother. She gives expression to this in 
Powers o f  Horror -  ‘ I expel myself, I spit myself out’(Kristeva 1982:3). As Anna Smith 
expresses it, for Kristeva, ‘Abjection unchecked recalls a state prior to signification, where 
there are destructive self seeking drives, but no symbolic system in a firm enough position 
to repress or displace these drives into speech’. She quotes Burgin who claims that it is 
‘not woman as such who is abjected but rather woman as privileged signifier of that which 
man both fears and desires: the extinction of identity itself (Smith 1996:152). Similarly, in 
her book Reading Kristeva: Unravelling the Double-Bind, Kelly Oliver points out that 
Kristeva suggests that in western culture, discourses on maternity do not separate the 
maternal function from that of women generally. Thus Oliver reads Kristeva as saying that 
women’s oppression generally can be partly attributed to discourses on motherhood and 
misplaced abjection (Oliver 1993a: 6)
Was the treatment of the ‘comfort women’ by Japanese soldiers and by the Imperial war 
machine, an inevitable aspect of the formation of the subject, of the fear and 
loathing/desiring of the mother (and by extension all women) that is part and parcel of that 
process. If this is so, as Anna Smith says ‘ how can we read Powers o f  Horror without 
being overwhelmed with loathing for the female body? How can we recognise abjection, 
without gouging out our eyes?’ (Smithl996:152). Kiisteva’s thinking on abjection may 
then provide a useful potential insight into the cause of women’s oppression that could be 
explored further.
Questions of our empathy with and relationship to the ‘Other’ have continued to surface in 
this study. Kristeva has suggested a model for ethical behaviour. She argues that ethics 
requires a bodily driving force, and would claim that the logic and law of ethics is already 
operating within the desiring body. She identifies three spheres in which the subject can 
become aware of and access alterity and otherness, poetry, psychoanalysis and maternity. 
Poetry points to the heterogeneity of language, it is open-ended and points to signification 
in process and subject in process. For Kristeva ‘the ethical cannot be stated, instead it is
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practiced to the point of loss, and the text is one of the most accomplished examples of such 
practice’ (Kristeva 1974:234, in Oliver 1993a: 182).
In psychoanalysis the alterity within is identified with the unconscious, which makes any 
fixed, stable, unified subject, truth or meaning impossible. According to Kristeva, 
psychoanalysis is therefore a space where an analysand can embrace the Other in herself, 
that alien Other that is both her unconscious and her cultural heritage, in order to live with 
her crisis in value (Kristeva 1987.55 in Oliver 1993a: 184).
However for Kristeva, it is maternity that is the very embodiment of alterity within, of that 
which cannot be neatly divided into subject and object (Oliver 1993a: 183). It is the 
supreme example of identity containing alterity as a heterogeneous other, without 
completely losing its integrity. It is in the maternal body that the dividing line between 
identity and difference breaks down. In her book Tales o f Love (1987b), Kristeva uses 
maternity as a model for what she calls an outlaw ethic, ‘herethics’. In her understanding, 
herethics sets up one’s obligations to the other as obligations to the self and to the species. 
This is thus an ethics of love and not of law, predicated on love of self. The model of 
herethics is the mother’s love for her child, which is also a love for herself and her own 
mother. The mother’s love is also the willingness to give herself up, to embrace the 
strangeness within herself (Oliver 1993b:6).
Thus Kristeva’s models for ethics, being poetry, psychoanalysis and maternity, are 
alternatives to judicial models of ethics that presuppose autonomous subjects who relate to 
each other through the force of law. Kristeva’s models operate from a basis in which the 
law or obligation is already internal to the subject. As Oliver comments, for Kristeva ‘ the 
law is turned inside out, it is within the body....there is no need for an external law that 
ensures the social relation. The social relation is inherent in the subject’ (Oliver 
1993a: 186).
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SummaiT
In their work regarding the body, Foucault, Butler, and even Merleau-Ponty seem to talk 
somewhat generally and at a distance, speaking objective truths about bodies, rather than 
truth from  ‘the body’  ^Merleau-Ponty sees an inter-twining of bodies, made of one flesh, 
but he deals with, as Caputo has said, bodies that are ‘agent’ bodies ‘which always seem to 
be in excellent health, quite well rested and fresh from a trip to the islands.’( Caputo 
1993:195). They are bodies that have choice, intentionality and agency, unlike ‘flesh’, 
which results from ‘disasters’ such as the enslavement of the ‘comfort’ women.
Caputo’s own engagement with ‘flesh’ is powerful, as an engagement with the reality of 
damaged bodies, but it comes after the events that have caused their suffering. However 
his hope that ‘to lend these claims an ear, to provide them with an idiom, to magnify their 
voice, to let them ring like bells across the surface of our lives’ to ‘ discourage cruelty’, 
looks to the possibility of a re-visioned future. Nonetheless, his perspective is from the 
viewpoint of one with power and self-determination rather than that of a victim, which 
brings with it dangers of paternalism and misunderstanding. It is important in this quest for 
a re-visioned future that the perspective and witness of the victim or potential victim of 
violence or abuse should be foregrounded.
Perhaps Scarry, whose work on torture details what happens to bodies in extreme 
situations, comes closest to allowing the witness of such suffering bodies. She also affirms 
the value of advocacy and support for those in suffering
Kristeva’s, ‘herethics’, offers a model for establishing positive connections and 
understandings between lived bodies. Using Kristeva’s terms, a compelling question for 
those vulnerable to abuse might be, can the embrace of difference either within or outwith 
ourselves allow the return of the repressed, the abjected, and enable the caress rather than
 ^Turner has criticised Foucault in this respect, ‘ .he ignores the phenomenology o f embodiment, the 
immediacy o f  personal sensuous experience o f embodiment which is involved in the notion o f  my body. My 
authority, possession and occupation o f  a personalised body through sensuous experience are minimalised in 
favour o f an emphasis on the regulatory controls which are exercised from outside’ (Turner 1984 :245)
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the blow. What tips the balance between Caputo’s competing poetics, and what can alter 
that balance?
Having reviewed some theoretical approaches, I will now approach a group of women, to 
explore what they feel about their gendered embodiment, and to see if describing their own 
bodies as sacred has meaning for them. Before proceeding to this, however, it is necessary 
to examine the possibilities and pitfalls of speaking of ‘women’s experience’, and to outline 
methodology and methods that are appropriate to use to best hear women into speech.
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Chapter Two
Women’s experience - in search of ‘women’s’ bodies
Keeping in mind the testimonies of women who are survivors of abuse and having found in 
theories of the body that I have explored some pointers towards a possible re-visioning 
bodies, I seek to understand what process of social change might open the way for greater 
individual agency for women. How does social change happen? To what extent do 
movements for change require accurate description of existing conditions and the meeting 
of some kind of criteria of objectivity in that description? What value is individual 
narrative and what extent can it meet such objective criteria for knowledge. Is a 
requirement of objectivity in study, related to our Enlightenment heritage, which 
presupposes the possibility of a ‘neutral’ unbiased, unsituated researcher? Is there 
knowledge that is only accessible to certain subjects? If so, what is the value of such 
‘situated knowledge’? Are all such knowledges equally valid, particularly in the pursuit of 
emancipatory social change? If all knowledges are ‘situated’ what possibilities are there 
for political alliance to pursue social change?
I want to approach such questions from a feminist perspective, but it has become apparent 
that in the twenty-first century the business of advocating strategies for social 
transformation from a feminist perspective is fraught with difficulties. Many of these 
centre on whether we can legitimately speak o f ‘woman’ or ‘women’ at all.
The problem with ‘women’, and ‘women’s experience’
From an emancipatory perspective there seems to be a need to be able to talk of women 
/woman as a category, but there is much concern as to what delineates that category. If this 
is taken to be some kind of ‘essence’, we revert to cultural feminism, where the ideology of 
a female nature or female essence, a stick to beat us with under patriarchy, is re- 
appropriated by feminists themselves in a effort to revalidate undeiwalued female attributes. 
Such moves have been challenged on the grounds that they are as essentialising as any
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androcentric perspective, and do not take account of differences between individual women 
with respect to other markers of identity such as race and class. Principally they leave 
women still defined by patriarchal power struggles - trying to use the masters tools to 
dismantle the master’s house (Lorde [1984] 1986: 158ff).
Caroline Ramazanoglu and Janet Holland in their article ‘Still telling it like it is?’(in 
Ahmed et al [eds.] 2000:207-220), acknowledge the tension that exists for feminists 
between the political necessity of looking at existing power relations, establishing what 
does and does not happen, and the need to acknowledge the strength of poststructural, 
postmodern and deconstructionist critiques whereby feminist claims to knowledge of 
women’s lives are questioned on a number of grounds. Many such critics (Benhabib et 
al. 1995; Braidotti 1991; Hekman 1997; Scott 1992.inRamazanoglu and Holland 2000:209) 
have claimed that the category of ‘women’ or ‘woman’ cannot be taken for granted as a 
natural category. They would assert that there is no pre-culturally constructed and 
interpreted ‘essence of ‘woman’. Any category o f ‘feminist knowledge’ is contested both 
by recent deconstruction of the feminist subject from postmodern and poststructuralist 
perspectives and the problematising of ‘women’s experience’ with the recognition of the 
diversity of women’s lives (Ramazanoglu and Holland 2000:208).
The issue of the subject of feminist enquiry is addressed by Judith Butler who does not 
negate or repudiate the subject ‘woman’ but sees her neither as ground or a product but 
rather as an accomplishment and a possibility (Butler 1992:9). For Butler there is no way 
in which we can speak of women as if ‘woman’ were a fixed category (Ramazanoglu and 
Holland 2000:209). Thus as Ramazanoglu and Holland say (2000:209), ‘Questioning what 
it means to know like a feminist produces intractable problems; feminists are not authorised 
to tell general truths about gender simply because they live as worn en.... there are no 
unproblematic ways of making knowledge claims’ It can, however, still be claimed that 
knowing like a feminist produces valid knowledge of social life, especially if it is 
recognised that this is not just knowing as a feminist among non-feminists but knowing as 
one feminist among other feminists, who are different from each other in many ways.
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Ramazanoglu and Holland stress that if feminists are going to go on producing knowledge, 
they will, in the current intellectual climate, have to answer for how knowledge is produced 
and what might make it in any way authoritative. Their suggestion is that a turn to lived 
experience offers a way foiward in this impasse. They assert that it is still vital to produce 
knowledge of social existence and to question how knowledge and loiowing selves are 
produced and made authoritative. ‘Defining what (materially, politically, discursively) a 
woman (or a man) is, requires empirical investigation of what people have in common, in 
terms of both their constitution as gendered subjects and the material conditions of their 
social existence. A politics of difference has emerged alongside knowledge of both 
common interests and social divisions between women. The question of who is a woman 
remains then empirical, but also normative, contingent and contested’ (Ramazanoglu and 
Holland 2000: 211). They continue ‘political expediency demands that as feminists we go 
on investigating and accounting for people’s gendered social existence and explaining how 
we justify the knowledge we produce’ (Holland et al 1998 cited in Ramazanoglu and 
Holland 2000 :205) They stress the need to ‘make our epistemic communities and our 
criteria of validity explicit and show how we are accountable for the knowledge we produce 
and our judgements between knowledge claims’ (Ramazanoglu and Holland 2000:217). 
This is something that I address in this study.
The authority of such knowledge is then based on a category of woman or women shaped 
by shared material conditions not a universality of essence or meanings. As Kate Soper 
argues, there is a ‘sex-specific but universal quality of certain conditions of general 
experience which justifies and gives meaning to collective gender 
categories’(Soper1990:243 in Ramazanoglu and Holland 2000:21 l).The fact that women 
in different social positions may experience sexism differently does not entail that they 
have nothing in common, they still suffer from sexism. Bearing out these observations, my 
own experience of world wide gatherings of women certainly confirms that there is 
something commonly recognised as domestic abuse, principally of women by men, across 
cultures, even though this may take culturally specific forms.
10 See discussion on ‘strategic essentialism’ p. 43 of this study
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At one end of the range of forms of legitimation of feminist knowledge are those who 
would see it as potentially scientific and would seek some legitimacy for it in terms of 
objectivity, as traditionally understood. ‘Feminist epistemologies must identify grounds for 
feminist knowledge claims that do not altogether abandon criteria of scientific validity (in 
the sense of some connection to the material world of people and events), (Haraway 1991; 
Smith 1997; Soper 1990) but are also self-conscious, questioning, reasonable open and 
just’(Ramazanoglu and Holland 2000:215). At the other pole, are those who embrace 
relativism and diversity and the value of localised knowledge but deny the generalisability 
of feminist knowledge, ‘Radical feminist theory tends to relate cultural practices directly to 
the reproduction of global patriarchal power making direct links between practices 
constituting gender and the violence of patriarchal power. Postmodern interventions focus 
on specific areas of concern and do not assume that they are necessarily part of a spectrum 
of oppression, though they may well be’ (Weedon 1999: 125).
The relativism inherent in a postmodern analysis is seen as troubling by many feminists 
who would still assert the need to be able to distinguish what can truly or falsely said of 
women Ramazanoglu and Holland (2000:212), take this position claiming, ‘To value 
and validate feminist knowledge of social existence, means taking a stand against 
relativism on the grounds that there really are material conditions of gendered power.’ They 
add ‘If feminism is to have transformative power, we cannot evade the difficulty of 
justifying what we know by collapsing knowledge either into language or into instability, 
uncertainty and diversity. Transformation requires both theories of power that can name 
real power relations (which are always conceptualised) and judgements (which are always 
normative) of which power relations are oppressive’ (Ramazanoglu and Holland 200212- 
213).
Finally, Ramazanoglu and Holland claim that the validity of feminist knowledge will 
depend on the power of feminist theory to make sense of people’s experience at a level at 
which it can be acted upon. In these terms justification of this knowledge is related to what
See Harding 1993:61 cited below pp. 39-40.
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such knowledge chang e sAl th ou gh  exercising minds in the academy, this is not simply 
an intellectual exercise, but one which touches lives.
The experience of the ‘comfort women’ reveals the importance of the question of the 
acceptance and validation of testimony. The women’s own accounts of what had happened 
to them, even when they began to surface, carried little authority, especially since there was 
no official documentation of their experience in records of the war. Their experiences only 
began to have some power to challenge the official account once alliances were formed 
with other women who could campaign on their behalf. The question of justification and 
validity of knowledge is a crucial one, which will be pursued throughout this chapter.
Feminist standpoint epistemology - A better view from somewhere
Exploring then the question of whose knowledge it is impoitant to consider, and what 
criteria we might use to validate knowledge, I turn to recent theories of feminist 
epistemology. One area of feminist theory that engages with the question of objectivity is 
feminist standpoint epistemology. Recognition of recent debates in this area is important 
for this study which is also concerned with women’s religious experience, since the 
centrality of ‘women’s experience’ as a basis for knowledge, has also been at the heart of 
the development of religious feminism. In the light of recent critiques, noted above, the 
question remains as to whether it can still legitimately be so.
Feminist standpoint theory has been significantly shaped by work done in the 1980s by 
American feminists Nancy Hartsock (1983,1987) and Sandra Harding (1986,1991) and also 
in the work of Donna Haraway (1991 [1988]).
Nancy Hartsock
Hartsock (1987) adopted an historical materialist approach to understanding ‘phallocratie’ 
domination and took as her starting point a methodological base provided by Mai’xian
See section on Sharon Welch pp. 48-51.
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theory, which she saw as an important epistemological tool for understanding and opposing 
all forms of domination (Hartsock 1987:216). This in turn had its beginnings in Hegel’s 
understanding that knowledge gained from the slave’s point of view in a master/slave 
relationship would be of a different order from that gained from the master’s perspective.
Hartsock, embraced the distinction made by Marx between ‘appearance’ and ‘essence’, 
which she employed to explore what she saw as dual levels of reality in Western society. 
As Marx had privileged the knowledge gained from the standpoint of the proletariat so 
Hartsock saw the value of knowledge generated from a specifically feminist standpoint 
(Hartsock 1987:217). She suggested that women’s lives make available a particular and 
privileged vantage point on male supremacy, and could allow an understanding of 
patriarchal institutions and ideologies, making it possible to see them for what they are; 
perverse inversions of more humane social relations (Hartsock 1987:218).
For Hartsock ‘A standpoint is not simply an interested position ...but it is interested in the 
sense of being engaged’ (Hartsock 1987:218). She also stressed that not all standpoints 
within society produced equally valuable knowledge. She contended that ‘there are some 
perspectives on society from which however well intentioned one may be, the real relations 
with each other and with the natural world are not visible’ (Hartsock 1987:218). In ‘The 
Feminist Standpoint’ Hartsock made a number of claims for standpoint positions in general 
and went on to find these criteria applicable to a feminist standpoint. A standpoint for 
Hartsock is predicated on the understanding that material life not only structures but sets 
limits on the understanding of social relations. She claimed that if material life is structured 
in fundamentally opposing ways for two different groups, one can expect that the vision of 
each will represent the inversion of the other, and that in systems of domination the vision 
available to the dominant group will be both partial and perverse. Furthermore, the vision 
of the ruling class (or gender) structures the material relations in which all parties are 
forced to participate, and therefore it cannot be dismissed as false (Hartsock 1987:218).
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Significantly, Hartsock makes clear, the vision available to the oppressed group must be
struggled for, and requires both the input of science and education for it to surface. i3
Again, looking at the situation of the ‘comfort women’, only when their experiences were 
seen from their standpoint by others as well as themselves was the behaviour of the 
Japanese Imperial Army exposed to the world for what it truly was, kidnap and rape. It had 
been concealed fiom many by the distortion of language, with the use of such expressions 
as ‘comfort women’ and comfort stations’ implying voluntaiy involvement of the women 
in a caring service.
The question of how such expression of specifically embodied experience, seeing from 
women’s position, can be known and how knowledge from such a standpoint finds a voice, 
is central to this present study. Is there always even language available for it to be thought 
and expressed in?
Hartsock also affirms that as an engaged vision, seeing from the standpoint of the 
oppressed, exposes real relations among human beings as inhuman, pointing beyond the 
present, carrying a historically liberatory role.
Touching on the issue of differences between women, feminist standpoint epistemology 
operates on the assumption that there are some things common to women’s lives, and for 
Hartsock these commonalities are rooted in all that stems from a sexual division of labour, 
in women’s involvement in creating the means of subsistence and in childbearing and 
rearing. While she would recognise differences between women she would claim to be 
basing standpoint theory on ideal types (Hartsock 1987:221)
Hartsock also brings to her analysis the understandings of ‘object relations’ theory 
concerning the development of male and female children. She claims that ‘The female 
construction of self in relation to others leads ... toward opposition to dualisms of any sort.
' ^  see Graham unpub: 18, for reference to the need for major cultural shifts before the story o f  the ‘comfort 
women’ could surface.
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valuation of concrete, everyday life, sense of a variety of connectednesses and continuities 
both with other persons and with the natural world. If material life structures 
consciousness, women’s relation ally defined existence, bodily experience of boundary 
challenges (such as menstruation and pregnancy) and activity of transforming both physical 
objects and human beings, must be expected to result in a world view to which dichotomies 
are foreign’ (Hartsock 1987:229).
Two decades on, sexual division of labour and child rearing practices are evolving into 
different patterns in the Western World, and perhaps it is now too simplistic to use such a 
concept as the sexual division of labour as the marker of commonality between women, or 
claim for all women specific characteristics shaped by their own child development. It also 
has been recognised that it is not straightforward to make a clear distinction between the 
marginalised and the dominant, nor regard the oppression of women as mono-causal. If, 
however, we do not adopt Hartsock’s categories (sexual division of labour and gender 
difference due to differential child development) as a basis for commonalities between 
women we are left with the question of what commonalities form that basis (see Woodhead 
1997:198-199).
Sandra Harding
In her more recent work Sandra Harding (1993) elaborates on her understanding of the 
feminist standpoint position. Originally, in her book The Science Question in Feminism 
(1986), Harding included feminist standpoint epistemology in her discussion of feminist 
epistemological frameworks. Principally referring to the fields of research in biology and 
the social sciences, she contrasted feminist standpoint theory with the insistence of feminist 
empirists that sexism and androcentism could be eliminated from the results of research if 
scientists would follow more rigorously and carefully the existing methods and norms of 
scientific research. Such feminist empiricists would argue that the sciences have been blind 
to their own sexist and androcentric biases.
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Harding noted feminist empiricism as being designed to make science better by producing 
less biased accounts, but she sees this as far too weak a strategy to maximise objectivity 
and claims that feminist standpoint epistemologies offer what she characterizes as strong 
objectivity. This is achieved through their questioning of both the methods and goals of 
research in order to eliminate sex/gender bias. As the ‘subject’ is always embodied, it is 
impossible to achieve a gender-neutral perspective, although historically the male 
perspective has usually been taken as such. Feminists question this ‘God’s eye-view’ 
which excludes all perspective, everything subjective and the very social nature of 
knowledge. The feminist contention is that this privileged perspective narrows and distorts 
the subject’s knowledge not only of social life but also of scientific facts. The ‘God’s eye 
view’, supposedly objective and neutral, reinforces male privilege, the marginalistion of 
women and excludes all non-privileged others. For Harding strong objectivity is present 
when one thinks from the perspective of the oppressed other. It is rooted in the 
understanding that the one who lives on the margins is forced to possess Icnowledge of both 
the privileged and the marginalised, hooks expresses this in relation to African American 
women
‘Living as we did -on the edge -  we developed a particular way of seeing reality. 
We looked both from the outside in and from the inside out. We focused our 
attention on the center as well as on the margin. We understood both. This mode of 
seeing reminded us of the existence of a whole universe, a main body made up of 
both margin and centre’
( hooks 1984:v in Kline Taylor 1990:65).
Harding asserts that strong objectivity is achieved by deliberately putting oneself in 
another’s position. This rejection of universalism does not imply an embrace of relativism 
or an abandonment of realism, for there is still a need for criteria for objectivity -not 
everything or anything goes. As Harding points out,
‘It is not equally true as its denial that women’s uteruses wander around in their 
bodies when they take math courses, that only Man the Hunter made important
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contributions to distinctively human history, that women are biologically 
programmed to succeed at mothering and fail at equal participation in governing 
society, that women’s preferred modes of moral reasoning are inferior to men’s, that 
targets of rape and battery must bear the responsibility for what happens to 
them....and so on -  as various sexist and androcentric scientific theories have 
claimed’(Harding 1993:61).
Donna Haraway
Donna Haraway explicitly explores the issue of objectivity because ‘we could use some 
enforceable, reliable accounts of things not reducible to power moves and agonistic, high 
status games of rhetoric, or scientific, positivist arrogance’ (Haraway 1991 b : 188). For her, 
feminist objectivity means quite simply situated knowledges. Objectivity turns out to be 
about particular and specific embodiment, and definitely not about the false vision 
promising transcendence of all limits and possibilities. The moral is simple: only partial 
perspective (of the marginalised) promises objective vision. As has been noted, in the work 
of Harding, for feminist standpoint epistemology all knowledge is partial, there is no God’s 
eye view. As Haraway has it ‘the knowing self is partial in all its guises, never finished, 
whole, simply there and original; it is always constructed, situated together imperfectly and 
therefore able to join with another, to see together without claiming to be another’ 
(Haraway 199 lb: 193).
For Haraway ‘subjugated’ standpoints are preferred because they seem to promise more 
adequate, sustained, indeed, objective, transforming accounts of the world. They resist 
both relativism and totalization. Haraway says ‘it is precisely in the politics and 
epistemology of partial perspectives that the possibility of sustained rational objective 
enquiry rests’ (Haraway 1991 b: 191 ).
Haraway (1991b: 193) makes clear that ‘The only position fiom which objectivity could not 
possibly be practised and honoured is the standpoint of the master, the Man, the One god, 
whose Eye produces appropriates and orders all difference’ For her positioning is therefore.
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the key practice, grounding knowledge organized around the imagery of vision - what is 
seen from where we are. Feminist embodiment, then is not about fixed location in a reified 
body, female or otherwise, but about nodes in fields, inflections in orientations and 
responsibility for difference in material semiotic fields of meaning. Haraway says 
(1991b:195), T am arguing for politics and epistemologies of location, positioning and 
situating where partiality and not universality is the condition of being heard to make 
rational claims.’
Critiques of Feminist Standpoint Epistemology
Criticisms that have been directed towards feminist standpoint epistemology are such as 
those levelled by Jane Flax who questions it on a number of counts. Firstly she says that it 
uncritically appropriates the Enlightenment worship of perfect reason. She says ‘ the 
notion of a feminist standpoint that is truer than previous (male) ones, seems to rest upon 
many problematic and unexamined assumptions. These include an optimist belief... .that 
reality has a structure that perfect reason (once perfected) can discover’ (Flax 1989 in 
Harding 1990: 84). She goes on to claim (Flax 1989 in Harding 1990: 84), that the notion 
of such a standpoint assumes that the oppressed are not in fundamental ways damaged by 
their social experience. This is an important point. First hand accounts of women who have 
suffered domestic abuse, especially those from Christian communities, reveal how difficult 
it is for such women to even name and give expression to their experience in cultures and 
climates where such things are thought not to happen (see Orr 2000). In such a context they 
may come to think that they are in the wrong. However given the appropriate support (as in 
the case of the ‘comfort’ women) this problem can be addressed.
Flax (in Flarding 1990:84), also raises the spectre of essentialism stating that a feminist 
standpoint position presupposes gendered social relations in which there is a category of 
beings who are fundamentally like each other by virtue of their sex -  that is it assumes the 
otherness men assign to women. Finally Flax says that such a standpoint position assumes 
that women, unlike men can be free of determination from their own participation in
See discussion on strategies pp 43-45 below.
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relations of domination such as those rooted in social relations of race, class or homophobia 
(Flax 1989: 56 in Harding 1990:84)
As has been pointed out, other writers are wary of anti-Enlightenment critiques, being 
concerned that the adoption of post-modern perspectives leaves the feminist project 
ungrounded and adrift. Such caution is found, for example, in the work of Christine Di 
Stefano. In spite of the issues raised by the postmodern approach she sees contemporary 
Western feminism firmly located in the modernist ethos and sees this as important since, 
‘The concept of gender has made it possible for feminists to simultaneously explain and 
delegitimize the presumed homology between biological and social sex differences’ (Di 
Stefano 1987:64 in Harding 1990: 85). Her understanding of the feminist case against 
postmodernism succinctly sums up the issues that are at the heart of this discussion. She 
claims that; ‘First, postmodernism expresses the claim and needs of a constituency (white, 
privileged men of the industrialized West) that has already had an Enlightenment for itself 
and that is now ready and willing to subject that legacy to critical scrutiny. Secondly.... the 
objects of postmodernism’s various critical and deconstruct!ve efforts have been creations 
of a similarly specific and partial constituency (beginning with Plato). Third, mainstream 
postmodernist theory ( Derrida, Lyotard, Rorty, Foucault ) has been remarkably blind and 
insensitive to questions of gender in its own purportedly politicized rereading of history, 
politics and culture. And finally....the post modern project, if seriously adopted by 
feminists, would make any semblance of a feminist politics impossible. To the extent that 
feminist politics is bound up with a specific constituency or ‘subject’ namely, women, the 
postmodern prohibition against subject centred enquiry and theory undermines the 
legitimacy of a broad based organized movement dedicated to articulating and 
implementing the goals of such a constituency’ (Di Stefano 1987:30-31 in Harding 
1990:86).
The postmodern critique of standpoint theory, along with the recognition of many other 
defining criteria for women’s standpoints such as Black, Latina, lesbian etc, has highlighted 
the question of differences between women and the sometimes marked differences between 
their social contexts. This has led to a recognition that there cannot be one single feminist
43
standpoint that can claim epistemic superiority. There has come to be an acknowledgement 
of a multiplicity of situated standpoints and knowledges. As we have seen there are those 
who take issue with such a critique, claiming that it undermines the basic emancipatory 
nature of the feminist project. Others have offered strategies for alliances and positioning 
in a postmodern world to address this problem.
Strategies for feminist research and action in a postmodern world.
Given this recognition, in a postmodern world of the multiplicity of standpoints and 
knowledges, coupled with the need still to explore the lived experience of women as 
advocated by Ramazanoglu and Holland, there remains the question of what form such 
exploration of experience might take if it is not to lead the way back to ‘essentialism or 
collapse into relativism’. Addressing these issues, Ngai-Ling Sum (Sum 2000, in Ahmed et 
al [eds.] 2000:131-144) explores Hilaiy Clinton’s construction of a ‘rights-based’ female 
subject at the Forth World conference on Women: a subject located within the 
Enlightenment time-space envelope. In response to this construction Sum turns to an 
understanding of human identities as embedded in time-space envelopes which reveals their 
great diversity and heterogeneity.
Sum sees feminist politics across time and space therefore as a complex interactive social 
field. This understanding was apparent in the Women’s Movements in the USA in the 
1980s as they for the most part rejected the image of a united sisterhood and put more 
emphasis on the multiplicity of organisations and structures (Sura: 2000:134). There was 
then a proliferation of identity politics, some responding to specific crises and policy issues 
relating to women’s lives, while others were more cultural. Indeed critical feminists 
foreground the issue of ‘difference’ and diverse identities (eg Haraway 1988; Ong 1988; 
Trinh T 1989; hook 1990; Goetz 1991; Mohanty 1991, in Sum 2000:136). Sum claims that 
the awareness of multiple female subjects embedded in different time-space envelopes is at 
the heart of the question of ‘difference’ The challenge as she sees it is for feminist 
scholarship is to realize women’s multiple voices without losing all the analytical power of 
‘women’.
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As has been noted, some feminists seem reluctant to abandon a core common identity as an 
important political foundation for empowerment strategies and as a basis for coalition 
building. Various strategies have been deployed by feminist writers to overcome this 
problem. For example Spivak (1988 in Sum 2000; 137), would retain the concept of 
‘essentialism’ to serve as such a provisional interventionist strategy. She suggests that 
‘female identity’ is produced and regulated in relation to particular contexts and axes of 
power. This makes it possible to ‘deal with several identities according to the axis of 
oppression at issue in particular situations without necessarily tying individuals to a 
specific all purpose identity’ (Sum 2000:137). Such an approach views the female subject 
as being scripted by structural contexts and social relations. In this way the female subject 
may be seen as ‘ a conceptual migrant whose identity is constituted by external conditions 
and moves strategically from one form of essentialism to another. Sum (2000:137) appears 
to suggest that such strategic essentialism can be deployed self-consciously to deconstruct 
categories and identities, thus offering a level of agency and self-determination. It offers 
oppressed groups strategic anchor points at which they can claim identity, but enables 
subjects to travel from one anchor point to another. This concept assumes the possibility of 
a subjectivity that is unitary but serialised. Sum however claims that this may be a concept 
that simplifies a more complex reality which often ‘ involves the tangled, shifting and 
highly mediated consciousness and subjectivities ...as well as the interpersonal and/or 
inter-group communications among feminists embedded in diverse time-space envelopes’ 
(Sum 2000:137). Alcoff (1988 cited in Sum 2000:137) likewise proposes employing the 
concept of positionality, understanding identity not as an immutable internal property of the 
person but as relative to constantly shifting external contexts.
A simitar kind o f  positionality is found in the work o f Donna Haraway who embraces the concept o f  
‘situated knowledges’ which rely on critical positioning. She has introduced a politics o f  engagement in 
which situated subjects need not rely on a shared ‘essence’ to act together. For Haraway it is possible for 
subjectivities to merge into a collective subject position (see Sum 2000:137).
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In her own work (Sum 2000:139) combines Balctinian-inspired work on ‘diaiogism’ and 
recent work on ‘governance’ as (the complex art of steering multiple agencies institutions 
and systems) in an attempt to answer such questions as:
‘Wliat kinds self-other relations are constructed in the inter-personal dialogues 
among multiple female subjects and how they are hybridized? Do they involve the 
building of new loosely coupled networks that enable multiple female subjects and 
groups to communicate? Do they span together individual groups embedded in 
multiple time and space and cross cut by diverse social relations? Do these groups 
act as carriers of different sub-goals and attendant conflicts? Are they entering into 
dialogues that are as yet uncharted by norms and if so, what are the new identities 
that are being constructed?’ (Sum 2000:141)
Such questions, the exploration of which are beyond the scope of this study, point up the 
complexity of issues of identity, and the difficulties of speaking of ‘women, in any straight- 
foiward fashion, and yet still seem to point towards a future of possibilities for the 
oppression of women to be contested.
Women’s bodies and beliefs.
One reason why I would wish to justify speaking of and researching ‘women’s experience’ 
in this study is that I want to explore women’s experience as it is shaped by, and interpreted 
in religious symbolism. The concept of ‘women’s experience’ played a crucial role in the 
development of feminist theology. In the early work of Salving, Christ and Plaskow 
(Christ and Plascow 1979), it offered, what we might call an epistemic break. With the 
publication of Rosemary Reuther’s Sexism and God Talk, (1983) it came to form the source 
and norm of feminist theological thinking.
The following use of the work of Grace Jantzen, a leading feminist philosopher of religion, 
and Sharon Welch, an influential feminist liberation theologian, reflects this centrality of
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women’s experience in feminist theology, and will be used to address principally, the issue 
of validation of knowledge gained from feminist standpoint positions.
Grace Jantzen
In her influential book Becoming Divine Jantzen asserts that ‘obsession with beliefs, truth 
claims and epistemic justification is part of modernity’s quest for mastery’(Jantzen 
1998:204). She is concerned with transformation strategies and she shifts the debate way 
from fixation on epistemic justification of truth claims, rather seeking the development and 
testing of a new feminist symbolic. Like Ramazanoglu and Holland, not wanting to see a 
slide into relativism, she asserts the need to evaluate such strategies. This is not as in the 
past, to discover the validity of religious truth claims but rather to discover that which will 
effectively enable humanity’s full flourishing, what Jantzen tenns ‘becoming divine’. For 
such evaluation she turns to criteria of justice, accountability and trustworthiness.
Jantzen would recognise at the heart of the alleged epistemic foundation of the philosophy 
of religion are the things it denies, that is, values, embodied situatedness and community. 
These she wants to bring to consciousness. She says ‘ In this move the old absolute/relative 
binary which dogs many discussions of truth claims (including feminist discussions) gives 
way to criteria of justice and trustworthiness, looking rather for new growth of flourishing 
than for assurance of salvation’(Jantzen 1998:205). Rejecting the possibility of the practice 
of neutrality and objectivity (the adoption of a view from nowhere) in any discipline 
including philosophy of religion, she questions the supposed neutrality of science, and 
engages with standpoint epistemology as outlined by Harding, Hartsock and Haraway.
In this context she employs the work of Helen Longino (1987, 1990 in Jantzen, 1998:207- 
209). She distinguishes between contextual values in science, which flow from the social 
and cultural commitments of the participants and affect what studies are undertaken, and 
constitutive values which are intrinsic to the practice of science itself, such as clear 
reasoning. Jantzen points out that Harding has argued that even in terms of constitutive 
values there is no such thing as neutrality in science, ‘ at every level science will bear the
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fingerprints of the social group from which it comes’ (Harding 1986:22 in Jantzen 
1998:209).
Jantzen applies these insights to the study of philosophy of religion and contends that in 
this discipline as in science there can be slippage from contextual to constitutive values. In 
matters of faith ‘the emphasis on the omnipotent, detached ‘God out there’ is....not 
unrelated to the ideal of neutral detached reasoning ....and this ideal of what reason is ...is 
permeated with values derived from its social context in a masculinist capitalist economy’ 
(Jantzen 1998; 209) She says that philosophy of religion therefore is founded on the very 
elements it tries to suppress, values, embodiment, situatedness in a particular community 
which shape its discursive foundations. ‘ the recognition that we are embodied, gendered 
selves and therefore socially situated means that it is within that social nexus, not as 
disembodied solitary thinkers, that we must become divine’ (Jantzen 1998:209). Jantzen’s 
project requires the acceptance of partial perspectives, but she stresses that this is a 
partiality not without standards of discrimination.
In reflecting on the criteria of accountability and trustworthiness which she would employ, 
Jantzen notes the highly ambiguous position that feminist philosophers of religion (along 
with those who work in other academic disciplines), find themselves in. Even while 
seeking to be accountable to communities of women and to thinking from women’s lives, 
she recognises that ‘There is no pure place for a woman to stand, no unambiguous subject 
position already available’(1998: 211). However she claims that creative moves can be 
made from such an ambiguous position and that it is from this position that some symbols, 
myths and practices will be seen to be more nourishing than others (1998:212). Exploring 
which religious symbols, and practices do nourish women is one of the aspects of this 
study.
Jantzen emphasises that it’s not just being in a certain marginal position that brings 
knowledge but it is the struggle for knowledge from that position. As noted in the 
foregoing discussion of feminist epistemology, such struggle exposes the ‘god-trick’ of 
supposedly value free objectivity. Jantzen quotes Donna Haraway (1991:191)
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‘the standpoints of the subjugated are not innocent positions. On the contrary they 
are preferred because in principle they are least likely to allow denial of the modes 
of denial through repression, forgetting and disappearing acts -  ways of being 
nowhere while claiming to see comprehensively. The subjugated have a decent 
chance to be in on the god-trick and all its dazzling -  and therefore blinding 
illuminations’ (in Jantzen 1998:216).
Looking to the evaluation of knowledge from subjugated standpoints, Jantzen says that 
even if these positions are not innocent, we can
do know what makes for justice, and can avoid sliding into relativism. She says 
(1998:216), ‘We do not know everything. Certainly there are ambiguities. But we know 
enough to join the struggle and if we joined it more we would know more.’
For Jantzen, from the perspective of the margin and the marginalised, while recognising the 
ambiguity of any position we adopt, it is necessary to do more than name the pain of 
experience. We need to generate creative alternatives, we need new creativity, new 
imaginary expressed in new symbolic and social order rather than turning the present 
system on its head(1998:217). In words she quotes from Haraway (1991:196),
‘ We seek not the knowledge ruled by phallogocentrism (nostalgia for the presence 
of the one true Word) and disembodied vision, but those ruled by partial sight and 
limited voice. We do not seek partiality for its own sake, but for the sake of the 
connections and unexpected openings situated knowledges make possible...the 
joining of partial views and halting voices into a collective subject position that 
promised a means of ongoing finite achievement, of living within limits and 
contradictions i.e.of views from somewhere’ (in Jantzen 1998:218).
Sharon D Welch
In looking to a theologically constructive approach to criteria for evaluating truth claims, 
Jantzen reviews the work of feminist theologian Sharon D Welch. Influenced by writers in
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liberation theology, Welch’s criteria for evaluating truth claims is praxis (Welch: 1985). She 
critiques Christianity not in terms of the adequacy of its doctrines but on the basis of its 
praxis. Following Mary Daly’s challenge that Christian faith itself is an expression of 
patriarchy and necrophil lia, (Daly 1978:39) she reminds us that the history of Christianity 
and its impact on society has often been damaging. She draws on Johnson’s (1979) Histoiy 
o f Christianity to make the point, ‘The atrocities of the Inquisition, the witchburnings, the 
Crusades, the justification of imperialism and colonialism, the perpetuation of sexism, 
racism, and anti-Semitism, the silence of most churches in the face of the horrors of war 
and the Nazi holocaust should cause even the most committed Christian to question the 
truth of Christianity’s claims’ (Welch 1985:4).
Christianity has failed morally from the point of view of those who have suffered because 
of its practices, and therefore according to Welch it has failed intellectually too. In 
Communities o f Resistance and Solidarity Welch quotes Dorothee Soelle ‘From a Christian 
point of view, theory and praxis can be understood today only in their unity, which means 
truth is not something that we find or by which we are found, but something that we make 
true’ (Soelle 1974:77 in Welch 1985:24). Soelle also claims, with regard to theological 
truth, ‘The truth of Christ exists only as concrete realization, which means: the verification 
principle of every theological statement is the praxis that it enables for the future. 
Theological statements contain as much truth as they deliver practically in transforming 
reality’(Soelle 1974:26 in Welch 1985: 25).
Welch also claims that the truth of God-language and of all theological claims is measured 
not by their correspondence to something eternal, but by fulfilment of its claims in history, 
by the actual creation of communities of peace justice and equality (Welch 1985:7). This 
links to her understanding of the divine being able to be known only in relationship. She 
says ‘the divine is that relational power, and...it is neither necessary nor liberating to posit 
a ground that exists outside of relational power’ (Welch 1990:173). As Jantzen interprets it, 
this divine is in no straightforward sense a person but rather ‘ the divine that is encountered 
is immanent in the beauty and pain and struggle of this world’(Jantzen 1998:222). Where 
Welch goes beyond most liberation theologians is in her approach to the scriptures and the
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person of Jesus, refusing to ground a feminist theology of liberation in either scripture or in 
the person and work of Jesus (Welch 1985:25). She contends rather, that Feminist 
Theology is grounded in the liberating experience of sisterhood and in the process of 
liberation from sexism.
Rejecting a God’s eye view, and any truth that is above and beyond human experience, 
inevitably raises the issue of relativism, which as we have seen, feminist standpoint 
epistemologists have addressed and struggled with. Where as other feminist thinkers have 
seen relativism as something to be avoided, Welch would claim that it is not possible to 
avoid engaging in relativism. She would claim that the tension between relativism or 
nihilism and universal normative claims is what is constitutive of a feminist theology of 
liberation. She says ‘This theology is the life and death struggle, both practical and 
conceptual, between nihilism and commitment between despair and hope’ (Welch 
1985:14). Jantzen believes that Welch does not have to go so far, and that it is possible to 
admit to a partiality of truth without allowing equal value to these partial truth claims.
Welch derives from Foucault the insight that the powerful have an enormous effect in 
defining what shall count as reality, (see Jantzen 1998:224). However, as we have seen, 
Jantzen argues that it does not follow from this that truth is relative or that there can be no 
criteria by which the religious symbolic can be measured, and that feminists concerned with 
justice, there is a strong reason to resist such a conclusion.
Through Foucault, Welch explores what she calls the power and peril of discourse. She 
understands that discourse does in some complex sense shape our world and that the same 
is true of theology. She claims that ‘The ways in which we understand the nature of faith 
and ecclesia are not irrelevant. These understandings have life and death consequences; 
they determine the type of response the church makes to particular social and political 
crises; they shape the nature of human community and human belonging in the world’ 
(Welch 1985:29).
51
Welch however takes scepticism to be part and parcel of her particular chosen position. For 
her even a feeling of certainty is contingent; it is only a sign of participation in a particular 
episteme. (Welch 1985:30-31). She defines the true as only that which liberates and 
fiirthers specific processes of liberation. Her emphasis is always on the quality of lived 
experience. For her, practice is the hermeneutic key and a means of verification. 
‘Responsible action ...is participation in communal work, laying the groundwork for 
creative response of people in the present and the future ...Responsible action provides for 
partial resolutions and the inspirations and conditions of further partial resolutions by 
others. It is sustained and enabled by participation in a community of resistance’(Welch 
1985:75). For Welch, ‘beloved community’ ‘names the matrix within which life is 
celebrated, love is worshipped and partial victories over injustice lay the ground-work for 
further acts of criticism and courageous defiance (Welch 1985:160).
The key point that I want to take from the work of Welch is her understanding of the 
importance of a practical concept of truth. She would say that above all liberation theology 
is the formation of a political understanding of truth and theory. It is the operation of a 
practical, not speculative concept of truth (Welch 1985:25).
Summary
Having addressed the vexed issue of speaking of ‘women’s experience’ in a postmodern 
context, I agree with Ramazanoglu and Holland, that from an emancipatory perspective, it 
is still important to speak of women’s experience, and to try to ascertain what that might be, 
even while being aware of the complexities involved in such a project. In this search, a 
situated view of society, a view from the perspective of women, and the distinctive 
knowledge gained from such a perspective, is essential. The theories and ideas that I have 
engaged with, so far, in this exploration offer some vision for social change. The pursuit of 
the flourishing of those at the margins, women and others, (Jantzen 1998) and the 
measurement of the truth of beliefs by what they make happen in the world (Welch 1985) 
point towards a ‘new imaginary expressed in a new symbolic and social order’ that Jantzen
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advocates. This carries echoes of the hope Caputo offers in his poetics of obligation and 
the possibilities inherent in Kristeva’s ‘herethics’.
I proceed in Chapter 3 to describe my research project, which has involved speaking to 
women who inhabit very much the same context and locality as myself, and Ï highlight the 
strategies for feminist research that Ï have employed, and my reasons for doing so.
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The ‘turn to experience’
I come to the point, in this search for ‘sacred’ bodies, to engage with the ‘turn to 
experience’ advocated by Ramazanoglu and Holland, even while acknowledging the 
political and conceptual difficulties involved this task. To do so will I hear from a number 
of women from Christian faith communities about their everyday lives, their feelings about 
their bodies and how their bodily awareness intersects with their religious life and practice.
One problem that has confronted me in setting up this research has been what research 
methods to use in order to generate experiential data. There are certain pitfalls in 
traditional research practice that I wished to avoid. I did not want the women I would use 
as participants to be simply passive objects of research, and extract knowledge and 
experience from them while offering nothing in return. While clearly having an area of 
interest and concern, I wanted the research to be open-ended, and to be led by what I might 
discover in the process of research to further understanding and analysis. I did not want to 
use solely predetermined categories that might silence women’s own voices. I also intend 
that this research should contribute to the emancipatoiy goals of feminism.
Before engaging in this research project, therefore, 1 explored literature on feminist 
research methods to draw out some principles by which to proceed. Much comment on 
methodology in feminist research does set it over against a traditional research paradigm in 
the social sciences whereby the researcher is expected to display neutrality, a degree of 
distance and objectivity and not to ‘contaminate’ or influence results by revealing his or her 
own life experience or personal standpoint. This renders the researcher a kind of data 
generating and gathering machine. Feminist methodology, or rather methodologies, since 
there is not one univocal approach that can be categorised in this way, offer a different 
paradigm, and practice.
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In her book Feminism and Methodology, (1987) Sandra Harding explores the question of 
whether there is a ‘feminist method’ for undertaking research. She proposes that there is 
something distinctive about the best feminist social inquiry, but that this difference is best 
not described as a distinctive method. For her, it is both more and less than that. She says, 
‘It is new methodologies and new epistemologies that are requiring new uses of familiar 
research techniques’(Harding 1987:2). Instead of delineating a feminist method, she 
suggests three features that for her distinguish the most illuminating examples of feminist 
research.
The first of these is that the questions and problems that such research addresses should 
come from the perspective of women’s experience (Harding 1987:7). Avoiding 
essentialism, Harding stresses that these women’s experiences are plural and diverse, since 
‘women’ come from different classes, races and cultures (1987:7).
Addressing this requirement of Harding, that problems for research should be generated 
from women’s experience, 1 wish to explore the difficulty of accurate expression of 
experience for women using existing language/^ I also suggest that there is a similar ‘lack 
of fit’ for some women, between their lived experience and much of traditional church life. 
I base this understanding on my own sense of frustration with some aspects of church life, 
anecdotal expressions of the feelings of other women, the worldwide growth of women- 
church and women identified alternative worship groups, which would appear to speak of 
some specific discomfort for women within traditional church structures.
Secondly for Harding, what makes feminist research distinctive is its goal, which is to 
provide for women explanations of social phenomena that they want and need. ‘Traditional 
research has been fo r men. In the best of feminist research, the purposes of research and 
analysis are not separable from the origins of research problems’ (Harding 1987:8). This is 
echoed by Cook and Fonow (1986:13 in Brayton 1997) ‘Feminist research is, thus, not 
research about women but research for women to be used in transforming their sexist 
society’. A key point made by Harding is that the motivation for feminist research is
This problem is highlighted in tlie work o f  DeVault discussed below, pp 58-62.
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related to feminist beliefs and concerns and deliberately begins with standpoints and 
experiences of women. It is of course not just feminist research that is motivated by certain 
political beliefs and concerns, but the political nature of all research in this respect often 
goes unacknowledged.
Engaging with this second characteristic identified by Harding, this study seeks to help 
both participants and the researcher to reflect on what affirms them in both in daily life and 
in religious life. It seeks to raise the question of whether women’s embodied selves, 
frequently denigrated in the past, both in patriarchal society and patriarchal expressions of 
religion, might not be comprehended as ‘sacred’, and therefore be understood to have a 
different status than has traditionally been granted to the bodies of women.
The final characteristic that Harding identifies as belonging to the best feminist research is 
the insistence that ‘ the inquirer her/himself be placed in the same critical plane as the overt 
subject matter’ that is to say that ‘the class, race, culture and gender assumptions, beliefs 
and behaviours of the researcher her/himself must be placed within the frame of the picture 
that he/she attempts to paint’ (Harding 1987:9). This is to avoid the fiction of an objectivist 
stance and to recognise that the cultural beliefs and behaviours of feminist researchers 
shape the results of their analyses no less than do those of sexist and androcentric 
researchers.
Expanding Harding’s point with regard to researcher and researched being on the same 
critical plane, to remove the power imbalance between researcher and subject means as far 
as possible involving participants at every level of the research and regarding them as the 
experts and authorities on their own experiences. It is allowing that participants are part of 
the social world and capable of thinking critically about it, that they can be conscious and 
aware of the patterns of social relationships and structures of power that can impact on their 
own lived realities. As Ralph (1988:139 in Brayton 1997) suggests, it is important to 
recognise that the women engaged as participants are ‘often actively working to change the 
conditions of their oppression’. In the context of feminist research, the research and the 
researcher become part of a process of consciousness raising and can have a significant
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effect on the lives of the interviewees. It is important to acknowledge that knowledge thus 
gained is not owned solely by the researcher as has been the tradition. Maintaining the 
originality and authenticity of how participants give meaning to their experiences is also 
part of what constitutes changing the power imbalance in feminist research. This issue of 
language will be addressed in greater detail below.
Recognizing the researcher as part of the research process is also important when 
addressing the balance-of-power between the researcher and the participant. As Stanley 
and Wise (1990: 23) point out ‘researchers’ understandings are necessarily temporally, 
intellectually, politically and emotionally grounded and are thus as contextually specific as 
those of the ‘researched’.’ The emphasis in feminist research is thus on it being a 
collaborative process between the researcher and the participant. As Patricia Maguire notes 
‘Participatory research proposes returning to the ordinary people the power to participate in 
knowledge creation, the power that results from such creation, and the power to utilize 
knowledge’ (Maguire 1987:39 in Brayton 1997).
A feminist researcher, interviewing women, is by definition both ‘inside’ the culture and 
participating in that which she is observing. The same insider/outsider experience is true 
with regard to other identities, such as (in this research project) being a researcher 
interviewing women from faith communities while also being part of that faith community. 
Oakley asserts that it is important for a feminist methodology of social science that ‘the 
mythology of ‘hygienic research’ with its accompanying mystification of the researcher and 
the researched as objective instruments of data production be replaced by the recognition 
that personal involvement is more than dangerous bias -  it is the condition under which 
people come to know each other and to admit others into their lives,’(Oakley 1981).
Addressing Harding’s final characteristic of feminist research, I conducted this pilot project 
aware of the power differential that can exist between researcher and participants. 
Attempting to minimise this has played a key part in my choice of sample and methods.
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Ethical issues
Research, especially into subject matter that might be regarded as private and personal, 
naturally raises ethical issues concerning research methods and use of data. One important 
question raised for feminist researchers is the nature of their relationship with, and 
commitment to, the participants. Some women interviewing other women (especially in 
situations where interviews are repeated) claim that the relationship that develops may be 
one of friendship, and one where the participants seek to establish common ground with the 
researcher. It may also be one where the researcher is offered hospitality as to a 
friend/guest. The researcher may also find herself being asked for advice, which is 
important to the participant. As Janet Finch observes from her own research, Tt seems to 
me that there are grounds for expecting that where a woman researcher is interviewing 
other women, this is a situation with special characteristics conducive to the easy flow of 
information’. She adds ‘ in the setting of the interviewee’s home, an interview conducted in 
an informal way by another woman can easily take on the character of an intimate 
conversation. The interviewee feels quite comfortable with this precisely because the 
interviewer is acting as a friendly guest, not an official inquisitor; and the model is in effect, 
an easy, intimate relationship between two women.’(Finch 1984:70). In such a situation the 
researcher finds it unproductive and very difficult to remain neutral and detached as 
advocated for a traditional researchers role. As Ann Oakley concludes ‘it becomes clear 
that, in most cases, the goal of finding out about people through interviewing is best 
achieved when the relationship of interviewer and interviewee is non-hierarchical and when 
the interviewer is prepared to invest his or her personal identity in the relationship’ 
(Oakley: 1981:51).
Oakley reviews the issue of power and ethics in interviewing, and explains her decision to 
follow other than traditional practice. Firstly she did not regard it as reasonable to adopt a 
purely exploitative attitude to interviewees as sources of data. Secondly she regarded 
sociological research as an essential way of giving the subjective situation of women 
greater visibility than it traditionally had had. She also found that personal involvement
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(answering questions etc) was much more likely to create a rapport with the interviewees 
(Oakleyl981:57).
Such ethical considerations have also been important in shaping my approach to this 
research in the choice of participants and the choice of research methods.
Talking and Listening from Women’s Standpoint
The case of the Korean ‘comfort’ women, referred to earlier in this study, demonstrates the 
difficulty many women who have suffered abuse find in articulating their experiences, and 
being heard. This difficulty in breaking the culturally enforced silence that surrounds such 
issues is demonstrated in other studies of violence against women (see Orr 2000). Although 
more apparent in the case of abused women, this difficulty for women in expressing 
experience in the language available to us appears to be a general phenomenon related to 
the nature of language itself.
Therefore, another aspect of feminist motivated and conducted research to which I pay 
close attention is the subject of language, and its adequacy for representing women’s 
perspectives and realities. Because the problem of hearing women’s experience is central 
to this study, I turn to an influential article by Marjorie L DeVault (1990), who suggests 
strategies for distinctive feminist research. She claims that language itself reflects male 
experiences and that its categories are often incongruent with women’s lives (DeVault 
1990:87), which leaves women with the problem of accurately articulating our experiences. 
If we also accept that ‘language to some extent shapes or constructs our notions of reality 
rather than labelling that reality in any transparent and straightforward way’ (Ehrlich 
1995:45 in Brayton 1997), there is a danger that that reality is constructed in such a way 
that is difficult for and damaging to women.
Given this situation, while using relatively conventional methods for conducting inteiwiews 
DeVault argues for a process of subversion, listening ‘as women’. She suggests that 
feminism gives us distinctive ways of extending the methods of the qualitative research
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tradition. She notes that language was an early topic for feminist researchers who 
demonstrated the way in which traditional linguistic forms exclude women (see Thorne and 
Henley 1975; Lakoff 1975; Spender [1980] 1985 in DeVault 1990:87). She points to a lack 
of fit between women’s lives and words available for talking about experience, and to the 
fact that for women there is often a need to ‘translate’ their experiences into available 
words, either saying things that are not quite right, or working at using language in non 
standard ways.^^ When they do this, some of it tends to disappear from the record. 
Accuracy and nuance is lost.
This applies even to the process of defining topics to be studied, in that there are not always 
accurate words with which to class women’s experience. A categoiy like ‘housework’ for 
example is too narrow and limiting a label for the range of activities undertaken and does 
not encompass the complex motivations involved (DeVault 1990 89-91). DeVault quotes a 
study by Paget (1981 DeVault 1990: 91), of women artists that recognises the existence of a 
sort of ‘problem with no name’, which in their case was a commitment to the creation of 
high art, that existed alongside a learned sense that as women they were not supposed to 
participate in the making of culture. This ‘barrier’ to creativity was experienced in various 
ways by the artists in Paget’s study and talked about indirectly but had not previously been 
given a label. Such experiences tend to get left out of dominant interpretative frames 
shaped around male concerns.
DeVault suggests that researchers need to interview in ways that allow exploration of 
incompletely articulated aspects of women’s experience. She suggests that researchers 
should not bring to the interaction preconceived categories but that rather find that 
categories to structure data that emerge in the talk. ‘This kind of interviewing, which does 
not begin from topics established in the discipline, will be more like everyday ‘woman talk’ 
than like survey research’ (DeVault1990:92).
E&S Ardemer 1975 have described women in society as a muted group. DeVault 1990: 90.
Spender (1980) demonstrates how language is ‘man-made’ and within it significant aspects o f women’s lives 
have been hidden and ignored (in Cotterill 1992 : 257).
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DeVault goes on to discuss the lack of fit of language for women and disappearance of 
experiences. She suggests (1990:92) that researchers can recover these experiences by the 
way they listen. They need to listen around and beyond the words used. If, as has been 
claimed, women interviewing women bring to their interaction a tradition of ‘woman talk’, 
this can mean that both participants help one another to use the interview as a ‘search 
procedure’ (Paget 1983 in DeVault 1990:93), co-operating in the construction of meanings 
together. This resonates with Harding’s goal of researcher and pailicipant being at the same 
level in terms of power.
To enable the recovery of previously unarticulated experience, an interviewer can be aware 
of and listen for the process of ‘translation’ De Vault claims that this process involves 
women in trying to deal with the incongruence of language in their everyday speech. To do 
this, women can use words that are ‘close enough’, responding fully to questions even if 
they are not quite appropriate. A woman interviewer can listen as a woman, and fill gaps 
from her own experience, (even if that experience is not an exact match). DeVault 
(1990:93-94) claims that it is the researchers job to listen for such points of translation and 
analyse the disjunctions that give rise to them. The interesting moments in such interviews 
are when respondents get stuck ‘... this halting hesitant, tentative talk signals the realm of 
not-quite-articulated experience where standard vocabulary is inadequate, and where the 
respondent tries to speak from experience and finds language wanting’ (DeVault 1990:95). 
De Vault found that such disjunctions were often signalled by the use of ‘you know’, 
which she interprets as a request for understanding between women of something that is 
hard to articulate.
In line with this thinking, conducting this research with a group of women with whom I 
have shared life and worship experiences over a number of years, means that we have a 
base of shared experience which may enable me to fill gaps and understand more readily 
what is expressed by hesitations and ‘you knows’ when I listen to these women. Although, 
obviously, as DeVault goes on to point out, there are areas of experience that are not shared 
simply because women listen to women.
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DeVault goes on to discuss the best methods by which to undertake such listening and 
recording of data in order to preserve the unique characteristics of women’s speech. She 
advocates that feminist researchers might do well to adopt a reasoned suspicion of standard 
solutions such as editing into pre-existing categories or the practice of ‘smoothing out’ 
respondents talk, changing dialect, removing repetition and so on, since these lead to 
distortion of women’s words and meaning (DeVault 1990:101). Again, in my listening and 
recording for this project I have avoided smoothing out talk and limiting analysis to pre­
determined categories.
De Vault alerts us to the politics involved in labelling women’s experiences, in collecting 
and analysing data. She quotes Frye: ‘Feminists have long been aware that naming is 
political- the labels attached to activities establish and justify their social worth -  and that 
women’s activities have often been labelled in ways that serve the project of controlling 
and subordinating women’(Frye 1983 in DeVault 1990:105). Much of the language 
traditionally used in religious discourse would appear to have had such an effect. My 
contention is that expressing religious experience, already a struggle to name the un- 
nameable, is further hampered for women, by the dominance of traditional language which 
may not ‘fit’ with experience.
In reasearch with women, DeVault argues for the employment of a strategic imprecision, 
and claims that instead of pre-existing categories, researchers would do better to use several 
different labels, sometimes more or less interchangeably, to refer to subtle shadings of 
meaning. She says that this strategy recognizes that different labels will capture different 
parts of the reality we are working to construct (DeVault 1990:105-106). Further, if the 
language is ‘man made’, it is not likely to provide ready made the words that feminist 
researchers need to tell what they learn from other women. She advocates that feminist 
texts should describe women’s lives in ways that move beyond standard vocabularies, 
commenting on the vocabularies themselves along the way (see for example Reinharz 1988 
in DeVault 1990). One consequence of using such strategies, is that readers as well as 
researchers will have to learn to understand and interpret such new ways with language.
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DeVault (1990:107) concludes that ‘part of the task of feminist writing should be to instruct 
a newly forming audience about how to read and hear our words.’
In this study as I detail below, I experimented with using drawing and writing to provide 
such a ‘new language’, in the hope that it might overcome some of the difficulties 
hypothesised in the access to and use of language for expressing women’s experience.
Having established some principles to guide this research, with the above discussion in 
mind, I have undertaken a small pilot study to explore whether there is indeed a lack of fit 
between language and women’s experience, in both what might be called everyday 
experience and religious/worship experience. To do this I have chosen to use a range of 
research techniques, taking account of the main principles for feminist research discussed 
earlier, particularly of the issues of equality and of the problems with language that 
DeVault highlights.
Researcher’s position and bias
In line with the preceding discussion, I offer an account of what I understand to be my own 
bias, positioning and expectations from this research.
Over recent years I have become increasingly aware of the realities of domestic abuse and 
violence against women. This has feed a passionate concern for a change in what Elizabeth 
Fiorenza (1996 39-55) has called a global epidemic of violence against women. Studying 
Feminist Theology has heightened my awareness of the patriarchal nature of much church 
tradition and practice and has given me a way of understanding when and why I have not 
always felt at home in worship, as a woman. Of particular significance in this process was 
the work undertaken on my undergraduate dissertation, in which I reviewed language used 
in worship, the use and authority of bible texts, traditional theologies, the power of ritual 
and body language in worship. Women’s bodies appear to have born the brunt of the out­
working of patriarchy in the church and my understanding has been that worship practices 
do not always include or give expression to women’s particular experience. I judge from
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interaction and conversation with other women, that I might not be alone in this. I come, to 
this study, with the acknowledged bias of looking for, and in some ways expecting to find, 
this Tack of fit’ to be true for other women who are part of Christian faith communities.
Choosing participants
The emphasis on the possible power differential between researcher and participants, raised 
by Harding among others, is one of the key considerations that has influenced the 
construction of this study. In this situation I took cognisance of the concern raised by 
feminist researchers, concerning the power of the researcher ‘Feminists emphasise the 
way in which the subordination of women can be reproduced in the research relationship. 
Women’s accounts can be constrained by the power of the interviewer and analysis taken 
out of their hands, thus producing outcomes against their interests. Consequently, feminists 
have stressed the importance of achieving symmetry in the social identities of the interview 
pair’(Holloway and Jefferson 2000:30). This was one reason why I have used existing 
friends in this study. Being small scale and exploratory this was never intended to be a 
study representative across age, class, race categories. Therefore I approached women who 
were well known to me to participate in this pilot study. All belonged, or had until recently 
belonged, to one of two neighbouring churches. This was also a loosely knit social group 
who, in different groupings, engaged in a number of social activities with one another. On 
the positive side I hoped that these would be people who would enjoy the workshop 
interaction, and with whom I already had a degree of rapport and trust that would enable 
effective communication in both group and individual interview settings. My decision to 
do this has meant that I was working with women of very similar backgrounds to myself. 
They too were white, middle class Protestant women, mostly of a similar age, with a 
longstanding church involvement. I therefore regarded that any perceived difference in 
power and status between myself and the participants would be reduced.
In choosing a group of women to work with who I would call friends, I was aware that this 
choice would shape the outcome of the study in certain ways. While established trust might 
lead to an openness in some areas, my ongoing relationship to the participants, which
eg. see Oakley (1981)
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would continue after the study, might mean that they would be to a degree ‘defended’ in 
what they might share with me, in a way that they might not be with an interviewer who 
was, and would probably remain, a stranger.
1 acknowledge that as the ‘researcher’ I have guided and lead this process and therefore 
have exercised a degree of power and control. I also have to acknowledge that, in a study 
which asks questions regarding worship experience, my having completed training for the 
ordained ministry may have granted me some perceived higher status. However, partly 
because I am not practising as a minister at present, I believe these women see me more 
readily as friend, wife, mother, fellow church member than in any way set apart by 
ministry. I know that they also have all contributed regularly and confidently in different 
ways to the construction and leading of worship themselves, and that this is part of the past 
experience that we share.
Validity and généralisabilitv.
An area of concern already explored in Chapter 2 is the validity of Icnowledge gained in the 
exploration of women’s experience. Ann Gray discusses the issues of validity, 
representativeness and generalisability of small-scale qualitative studies in her book 
Research Practice for Cultural Studies (2003:71-74). She claims that they tend to be strong 
on ‘validity’ but weak on ‘generalisability’, with validity being taken to refer to the 
accuracy of the picture presented of the subject and the context of study. She states ‘if what 
you are after, is data of subjective accounts of what people are doing, how they account for 
their lives, their passions, their sense of self, then the most valid research method is that 
which will enable the researcher to listen to those accounts, those narratives, those stories 
of the everyday’(Gray 2003:71), While this kind of validity may be guaranteed by small 
scale studies such as this, it must be allowed that questions remain over the validation of 
interpretations of such data. One way of addressing this problem is to employ some method 
of ‘technique triangulation’, contrasting data gathered by different methods, which will 
confront threats to the validity of the analysis and allow differences and contradictions to
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emerge. By employing different methods of data generation Ï have attempted to do this, 
albeit on a small scale.
The question of the generalisabilty of conclusions drawn from such a small scale study is a 
valid one. Gray (2003:73) refers to the understanding of Richard Johnson that such small 
scale studies are not, as we might think, simply about ‘individual’ attitudes, but about 
shared (or not shared) formations, and that taken from this perspective, these small studies 
are ‘ likely to have a wider range of occurrence than the single example suggests’(Johnson 
1997:467 in Gray 2003 :73). They may also bring into the overall picture, the perspectives 
of those who tend to be on the margins and can as Johnson claims ‘reorder a taken for 
granted landscape’(Johnson 1997:470 in Gray 2003:74).
Methods employed in this study
Taking account of both Harding’s emphasis on the issue of equality in the research situation 
and DeVault’s concern for women’s experience to find a voice within such a situation, 1 
have employed three different methods in this pilot study, in order to address these areas of 
concern, and move beyond the traditional interview approach to gathering data. In using 
these particular methods, I wanted to employ a process that was as open-ended and 
exploratory as possible, which would allow for a breadth of response, and for the 
participants to lead the exploration into unexpected areas, not foreseen by the researcher.
* The first method was to encourage creative responses from participants in the form of 
pictures and writing.
* The second was to work with participants in groups engaged in a common task to 
stimulate discussion and interaction, taking advantage of the different dynamics created in a 
group setting.
* The third involved interviewing participants to encourage them to construct life- histoiy 
narratives focussing on their church/worship history.
I outline the way in which I used these three models and my reasons for doing so below.
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Creative response -  the ‘draw and w rite’ technique
With concern for the problem of language and the issue of hearing women, my first concern 
was to find a way in which women could express their thoughts and feelings other than in a 
traditional interview situation.
I wanted to use a technique that allowed for a combination of verbal and non-verbal 
response, asking participants to illustrate their feelings about their bodies, as they felt 
comfortable, in drawings and by writing. I searched research literature to discover other 
studies employing such techniques. I found one set of techniques similar to that I proposed 
to use, in market research literature, in descriptions of ‘projective techniques’. These were 
originally developed by clinical psychologists and may be classified as a structured, 
indirect way to investigate underlying beliefs, attitudes, feelings or motivations that 
respondents may find it hard to articulate otherwise (Donoghue 2000:47). ‘Projective 
techniques help the researcher enter the private worlds of subjects to uncover their inner 
perspectives in a way they feel comfortable with’(Donoghue 2000:47). They are also 
claimed to be of use in discovering ‘the person’s characteristic modes of perceiving his or 
her world and how to behave in it’ (Donoghue 2000:48). These techniques are regarded as 
useful in situations where it might be difficult to find out what people think and feel by 
direct questioning, hence my interest in using something similar to help the participants to 
formulate and give accounts of experience that they might not have thought about in these 
terms before.
Projective techniques involve the use of prompts or some kind of stimulus which may be 
more or less structured to which participants are encouraged to respond, they involve such 
things as word-association, sentence completion, story completion, role-playing, writing 
dialogue for cartoon characters. In the initial workshop section of my research I proposed 
using something akin to what has been described as an expressive projective technique.
See David Fetterman 1998; 55-56 for a brief outline o f the use o f projective techniques in ethnographical 
research.
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‘A subject is asked to role-play, act, draw or paint a specific concept or situation. 
Expressive techniques focus on the manner in which the subject constructs something, 
rather than on what it represents’ (Donoghue 2000:49). I anticipated that I would be 
interested both in the manner of construction of responses and what they might represent. 
It has also been claimed that projective techniques are of use in the exploratory stage of a 
research project, when hypotheses are being sought, and that when they have brought 
otherwise ‘hidden’ attitudes and feelings into the open, other research techniques may be 
employed. This confirmed that this was an appropriate technique for my purposes.
One possible draw back of such a technique would be that it might be regarded as in some 
way under- hand, eliciting information by stealth that a participant is not consciously and 
willingly sharing. If however the intention of the project is to aid the communication of 
feelings that it might be difficult for women to express in standard language, and if 
participants are involved in reflecting on and interpreting data then such a criticism loses 
some of its force.
It is also claimed that one draw-back of projective techniques is the considerable degree of 
subjectivity that is inherent in the interpretation of data thus generated. It must be admitted 
that such data could lend itself to being shaped to fit a particular hypothesis, an eventuality 
to be wary of in analysis and the drawing of conclusions.
As I searched research literature, the other use of a similar technique, I found to be the 
‘draw and write’ process used in studies with children, concerning their understanding of 
health and safety issues (Wetton and McWhirter 1998). The researchers in these studies 
used this method because they felt it gave them insights into the experiences and 
understandings of participants whose language skills were limited. In the context of this 
research I was proposing their use in a situation where it is hypothesised that language 
might not readily be available to give accurate representation of feelings and experience. 
One aspect of this technique that I employed was to use the drawings to provide a personal, 
relevant, starting point to focus discussion in a subsequent interview. Whetton and
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MacWhirter in reporting this study do note that the meaning of drawings can be ambiguous 
and that analysis is always subjective (Wetton and McWliirter 1998; 269-273).
Finally, in formulating this creative response method, Î drew on a paper dealing with 
‘Creativity within Qualitative Research on Families: New Ideas for Old Methods (Deacon 
2000), which advocated the use of a number of creative methods, including sculpting, 
photography, and videography, art and drawing, role-playing, writing exercises, metaphors 
and timelines, in research concerned to uncover perceptions, feelings and life events of 
participants. In this paper Deacon suggests that use of such methods, while rare in both 
qualitative and quantitative research literature may be a better fit for those studying 
dynamic living systems than those traditionally used. She also picks up the point already 
raised that such methods may be of use to those seeking to engage in a participatory 
research. ‘The methods attempt to reduce the level of researcher participant hierarchy and 
create partnerships between all those involved in the research’ (Deacon 2000:1).
Group work
Another research technique that has been used for many years in market research, is the 
employment of the focus group or group interview. It is now widely used in qualitative 
research principally to examine the ways in which people, in conjunction with one another, 
understand the topics that the researcher is interested in. Such group work offers a dynamic 
that is different from that of one-to-one interviewing. It allows participants to challenge 
and/or affirm one another’s views, and for different perspectives to be shared. The focus 
group allows the researcher to study the ways in which individuals collectively make sense 
of a phenomenon. They may encourage some participants to express themselves in ways 
they would not in an individual interview situation, although equally there may be those 
who would say less in a group setting.
Alongside the other methods I employed, I chose to generate data in two group settings, 
because such group work has some characteristics that make it valuable as a method for 
feminist research. The group setting (especially as in this case a group of existing friends
69
meeting together for an evening) is less artificial than other methods because such group 
interaction is itself part of everyday life and discussion proceeds in a natural way. As a 
result, it has been claimed ‘there is a greater opportunity to derive understandings that 
chime with the ‘lived experience’ of women’ (Bryman 2001:348).
Such a method means that the individual is studied as a social being, rather than as a 
separate entity devoid of a social context, although an all-women group is obviously only 
part of the individuals social context. Working with participants in a group setting also 
affects the power dynamic between the researcher and respondents. In a group respondents 
have power to shape the interaction in a way that they might not in a traditional one-to-one 
interview setting.
Madriz (2000) says in her paper ‘Focus groups in Feminist Research’ that, for the reasons 
cited above, ‘focus groups can be an important element in the advancement of an agenda of 
social justice for women, because they can serve to expose and validate women’s everyday 
experiences of subjugation and their individual and collective survival strategies’. This is a 
key theme of this study.
Life-historv interviews.
Another tool available to the qualitative researcher is the ‘narrative’ interview, or what is 
sometimes called a ‘life-history’ interview. Having elicited creative responses and group 
conversation from the participants, I felt I would need to put this material into the context 
of their on going lives, to know more of what one of the respondents called her ‘journey’. 
With an interest in the process of social change, I wanted to hear from these seven women 
who ranged in age from thirty two to sixty five, of the development of their understandings 
about themselves, about where they felt they fitted in religious and worship terms and how 
their patterns of conformity and resistance to cultural pressures had changed over time. I 
decided, therefore, to conduct one-to-one interviews, in which I began by asking the 
participants to tell the stoi-y of their church life to date.
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Once again in line with a concern for conducting research according to feminist principles, 
this form gives a greater degree of power to the participant who has an open canvas (in this 
case,‘your church life from when you were wee’) to construct and select the parts to tell 
that are of greatest significance to them. This process might be viewed as the construction 
of a ‘self but it also reveals much about society. As Gray points out in her discussion of 
narrative research methods, ‘..the potential for putting together our identity and subjectivity 
is always shaped and constrained , or enabled by our position within the social structure’ 
(Gray 2003:111).
In using the participants narration of their own histories, I am aware that as Holloway and 
Jefferson caution,’ Neither selves nor accounts are transparent in our view. Treating 
people’s own accounts as unproblematic flies in the face of what is known about people’s 
less clear-cut more confused and contradictory relationship to knowing and telling about 
themselves’ (Holloway and Jefferson 2000:3). However my interest lies more in accessing 
the feelings about themselves and what they think is important in their stories, than that 
such narration should reveal historical truths.
Conduct of research
Having contacted participants and before embarking on the study, I outlined the nature of 
the study, gave participants a written outline of what it would involve for them, covering 
issues of confidentiality, the possibility of withdrawing from the study at any point, and 
their ownership of data and obtained their written permission to proceed.
As indicated, the first part of this study consisted of employing a creative method to 
generate data from the participants. Since I was also planning to work with respondents in 
groups to take advantage of group dynamics, I decided to ask them to complete individual 
creative tasks as part of a workshop session in which they would also undertake a group 
exercise. I therefore ran two workshop sessions, one with four participants and one with 
three, during which individual creative exercises and the group tasks were completed. By
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doing this I was able to shorten the time scale of the study and administer the individual 
creative tasks in a controlled situation,
Individual creative tasks
For the first creative exercise, I gave participants a prompt sheet which suggested that they 
draw and write responses on a blank A4 sheet (see instructions to participants in Appendix 
1). They were to imagine themselves in an every-day situation of well-being. I provided a 
range of artistic materials, so that they could if they wished make their pictures colourful, 
sparkly etc. Only on completion of the first sheet were they given the second in which they 
were asked to complete a similar task, but this time projecting themselves into their usual 
worship situation.
With the issue of power in the research situation in mind. I also completed the individual 
tasks alongside the participants, both to experience for myself what might be involved in 
doing what I had asked others to do, and for that part of the evening at least, to put myself 
on something of a level plane with the other participants.
The data that resulted fiom this first, creative method of investigation was two pictures 
(with words written on them) per participant.
A positive outcome from doing the individual creative work, before moving to the group 
interaction was that participants were oriented to the topic and had had time to think about 
it individually, which enriched the interaction and response for the group work. It also 
provided a non-threatening beginning to the workshop evening. As the participants were 
assured, their individual responses were confidential and only seen by the researcher.
Group work
The second part of each workshop evening involved a joint exercise when we drew, on a 
large piece of frieze paper, a life sized woman (who came to be known as ‘the big
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woman’). Picking up on the starting point of the first exercise, this was to be an imaginary 
woman who was in a situation where she felt comfortable. I guided the drawing of this 
woman, beginning at her head, asking the participants prompting questions such as ‘what 
would her hair be like’ and so on. This process led to input and interaction by the 
participants, covering areas such as body shape, clothes, comfort, and conformity.
Life-historv interviews
Having generated data in creative form and by group work, as soon as possible after the 
workshop sessions, I conducted individual interviews with the participants, each lasting 
about an hour. Having checked my knowledge of their basic biographical details to be 
correct, I proceeded to ask the participants to sketch out their religious/church experience to 
date.
The one-to-one interview situation also gave me the opportunity to see if they had anything 
else to add or say about the pictures they had made (which I showed them again), to ask 
some prompting questions about what they might consider sacred in their everyday lives 
and whether or not they might consider their bodies sacred, and finally to ask for their 
feelings about the methods we had used, particularly the creative work.
By using the three methods outlined, I acquired a rich pool of data in the form of pictures, 
recorded and transcribed group interaction and recorded and transcribed individual 
interviews with a strong life history component. In the following chapter I review the data 
and highlight the results of most relevance for my ongoing search.
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Chapter 4
Research results -  women’s bodies in image and story
The methods that I employed in this study meant that my participants provided three types 
of material. Firstly there were the pictures that they had drawn (two apiece) and the writing 
they had done on the pictures. Secondly I had taped conversations from the two workshop 
sessions when we were engaged in drawing the ‘big woman’. Finally I had 
autobiographical (taped and transcribed) accounts of their church/worship history from 
individual interviews, along with other comments on sacredness and bodies also from 
individual interviews.
It is possible to think of a research process such as I have engaged in as being witness to the 
production of ‘subjectivities’(Gray 2003:184). Gray describes such research as ‘revealing 
some of the conditions of social becoming’(2003:184). She goes on to cite Rose, who 
follows the later thinking of Foucault in understanding that ‘people are subjected to a 
complex mixture of technologies, in shaping the self, but are at one and the same time 
active subjects engaging in deploying the tactics of the self when inhabiting different sites 
and concomitant identities’(Rose 1996 in Gray 2003:184). Questions of subjectivity, 
technologies of self and agency have been woven through this disseitation and I am seeking 
to discover if these women have in some way shaped the selves they have become. It is 
with such questions in mind that I approach this data. I would want to describe this process 
of social becoming over time as producing what Kristeva has called ‘subjects-in-process’.
In her discussion of the production of subjectivities, Gray also speaks of ‘repertoires’ of 
behaviours that are available to subjects in process, which she describes as ‘currently used 
systems of terms used for characterising and evaluating, actions, events and other 
phenomena’(Potter and Wetherall 1987:149 in Gray 2003:165). I am interested in whether 
such repertoires can be identified in the material that I have collected.
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Finally Gray (2003: 184) speaks of institutions inviting certain subjectivities and another 
underlying question in any analysis of this material would be to ask if our churches invite 
identifiable subjectivities, in this case from women who are long-term members.
In my presentation and analysis of data, then, I will be seeking to identity discourses of 
shaping whether conformed to or resisted in society, and ask whether such discourses also 
operate in church life.
The ‘selves’ in the pictures
I begin reviewing the data with a close examination of the pictures produced with the ‘draw 
and write’ technique. To safeguard their identity, I have given the participants names other 
than their own.
These pictures (Appendix 2) are unique personal documents -  personal in style as well as 
content .They are therefore difficult to analyse and compare. I also take cognisance of the 
comment of one of the participants with regard to interpretation of such creative work, 
which she made in the individual interview, when we were discussing the value of doing 
the drawings.
Dawn  QS soon os you have a drawing th ere 's  lots of levels of
interpretation. Again one of th e  things with a r t  therapy is 
th a t  th e  a r t  th erap ist is actually not supposed to  in terp re t 
someone else's drawing cos its up to  th e  someone else to 
bring th a t  out fo r themselves.
Obviously such documents are open to many levels of interpretation. As I look at the 
pictures to identify presentations of selves, I will be making deductions that are simply that, 
and other interpretations of the material are of course possible. Since these pictures provide
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data that is open to multiple interpretations the employment of two other methods in this 
project, means that I can confirm impressions and investigate further the clues to particular 
subjectivities that I see presented in them.
I have known all the women taking part in the study for at least five years . It is inevitable 
that some of what I deduce from all the forms of data will be shaped by this knowledge of 
them and their lives. Such a close relationship can be a positive situation for hearing from 
experience, in line with DeVault’s suggestion that women interviewing women can fill in 
information from shared experience, where there are gaps and hesitations.
To reiterate on the process, each participant produced two pictures. For Picture 1 they 
imagined themselves in an everyday setting that gave them a sense of well-being. For 
Picture 2 worship they imagined themselves in their usual worship setting. (See Appendix 
1 for sheets that outlined each task and Appendix 2 for the pictures themselves.)
Eilie
Picture 1
The self in this picture is slightly sketchily drawn, perhaps showing some uncertainty but 
she is in bold black, and the statements written on the picture are confident. There are 
touches of colour, and sense o f the importance of the sensual, ‘hot water, candles, nice 
music’. The image of a woman luxuriating in a hot bath, enjoying wine, music and candle 
light, is one that can be found in contemporary media and advertising, signalling a taking 
care of oneself. It is thus, for Ellie, an image of well being, but at the same time it is one 
from a cultural repertoire that is familiar and easily read.
Picture 2
The figure in this picture is larger than that in the first picture, but much more lightly 
sketched. The words however are confident, ‘I would feel at ease with myself . This self 
is also one who appreciates what comes to her through her senses and being in relationship 
to others. This second picture has no colour.
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Sarah
Picture 1
The self of Sarah’s first picture is bright and at the centre of a network of lines that connect 
her to other things that she enjoys or that are important to her. Family ‘matter most’, 
although they don’t always bring a sense of well being . There is an appreciation of the 
sensual, I like fabrics that feel silky’ and the joy of dancing ‘countiy dancing makes me 
feel very alive’.
Picture 2
The self Sarah presents here is smaller and seems fiirther away, somehow dwarfed by the 
big seat and surrounding space. The written comments present someone who looks for 
intellectual engagement in the worship situation, ‘like to feel stretched in my thinking 
and questioning’ and ‘good sermon makes me feel alive’. Once again this second picture 
is solely in black and white, and less bold than the first.
Lizzie
Picture 1
Lizzie wanted to present two different aspects of herself in her first picture. One offers a 
beautiful image of her naked and with child and the comment ‘I feel gorgeous and veiy 
sexy. I fee! complete.’
The other is of her drawing at Art School with again a strong sense of contentment. ‘I am 
absorbed and happy. I could do this without stopping, forever.’ The self she presents 
in both these images is creative and totally absorbed, essentially herself and free from 
outside pressure. Such pressures to conformity are still however ‘in the picture’. There is 
still a concern for body size and image, I like to wear comfy clothes and not look too 
fat, and I like swimming....I am not heavy.’ This picture has no colour, but is 
confidently drawn.
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Picture 2
The self in Lizzie’s second picture is slightly more hazy than in her first and blends in to a 
degree with the surroundings and those who are around her in a circle. This ‘diffusion’ is 
also expressed in some of the words she has written: ‘chanting involves feeling of 
‘otherness’, ‘extension’.’ Lizzie is the one participant in the study who no longer 
worships regularly in a mainstream congregation, and the worship setting she depicts 
herself in, is obviously not a standard Sunday morning service in one of the mainstream 
churches. She shows herself as having chosen a different form for her spiritual expression.
Alison
Picture 1
In this picture Alison presents herself as actively engaging with the natural world, which 
she has depicted as bright and colourful. She has a physical appreciation of the world 
around, confirmed by her writing ‘awareness of senses’. She has not included anyone else 
in this picture as she had the option to do but has written on it, ‘solitude and 
companionship’. She also has written on the picture, away from problems -yet time to 
reflect on issues at a distance’. The pose of the figure is one who is travelling. The 
drawing, writing and illustrating o f this picture are all firmly and boldly done and it 
conveys a confident ‘self, content and at ease.
Picture 2
In her régulai’ worship setting, Alison is here more hemmed in than in her first picture, 
though she is a similar size to the figure in the other picture and equally boldly drawn. She 
is face on to the ‘viewer’, available and more passive in stance than in her first picture. 
There are other people in this picture shown by the backs of heads, and a minister. There is 
mention of ‘children’ and ‘asylum seekers.’ Other comments on this picture reinforce the 
impression that the self here is more under pressure and having to d’y harder to ‘fit’ with a 
situation that is not quite natural to her (h i a church with a different theological stance than 
her own in which she serves as a deacon.)She displays a little ambiguity about the worship, 
‘singing, when I can relate to the music and words makes me feel alive.’ and sermons
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sometimes inspiring and encouraging’. As in all but two of the second pictures, there is 
no colour in this picture.
Dawn
Picture 1
In her first picture, Dawn presents herself walking off into the hills, she is active, not just 
presented to the gaze of the other. She stresses her love of, and affinity with, the natural 
world. She writes ‘Not really a city girl.’ She presents herself and someone who enjoys 
freedom and being able to decide for herself, ‘happy that I can come out to walk, climb, 
wander — no restrictions....being able to choose where to go, where to drive or walk.’ 
She also presents a self that is both happy to be solitary and curl up with a book, and who 
enjoys the company of others (and the cat!)
Picture 2
Dawn’s second picture is softer and more sketchy than the first and has no colour. The 
figure is planted in the centre of the page, and is relaxed and receptive. This is again a 
situation in which she feels she can make choices and decide how to dress to feel 
comfortable. She is aware that this has not always been the case in other worship settings. 
She writes ‘ feel that this church is a place without judgements on body or what to 
wear and how to look. I have been to different churches in the past.’
Felicity
Picture 1
The figure in both of Felicity’s drawings is in a very similar pose. The pose may be one of 
welcome, or dancing, but it is a very open pose and could have a vulnerability about it. It 
presents her wholly straight on to another’s gaze. The first picture, the everyday picture, 
has a colour and softness and sense of light that is not in the second picture. The words 
written about the figure in this first picture are all positive evocations of nature, friends and 
family and things of the senses.
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Picture 2
This picture is not coloured and the colours mentioned in writing are more sombre than in 
the first. While there are still positive things mentioned in the words written around the 
figure, the self presented here has a church past that was obviously not what she would 
have chosen, which is still conjured up by the present church experience,’ Prayer book 
service-childhood memories - endless services boredom, stifling Sunday atmosphere- 
no fun, no TV, only Christian books! !’
Jean
Picture 1
Jean presents two aspects of herself in her first picture, both of which face the world with a 
smile of contentment. There is great movement and style in the dancing figure and an 
obvious sense of joy and confidence in what the body is doing. She describes the seated 
figure as Alone and at ease.
Picture 2
While the drawing is confident and bold, the self in Jean’s second picture appeal's in a 
quieter more reflective mode, but again with a sense of being at ease with herself. There is 
colour but it is muted
Looking at the pictures in their pairs it is possible to see if there are any obvious differences 
between them and to check if these differences are common to all or most of them. One 
thing that was apparent when comparing the first (‘everyday’ picture), with the second 
(‘worship experience’ picture), was that in all the pairs except two, the first picture had 
some colour and the second had none. The exceptions were the drawings of Lizzie both of 
which were done in soft pencil, and those of Jean who put sombre colour in her second 
picture. Whether this lack of colour in the second picture indicates anything significant I 
am not sure. A bigger sample would be needed to show if this was a general trend, then it
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would be interesting to explore why the church setting would be one not associated with 
bright colours of dress or setting.
Another occurrence in both workshop sessions which was particularly noticeable in the 
first, was the difference in the levels of conversation and silence as the participants 
completed the first picture and then the second. In both workshops there was virtual silence 
during the completion of the second task (illustrating the participant in a worship situation) 
as opposed to the first task (illustrating a more eveiyday) situation, during which there was 
more chat and banter. I asked participants in subsequent interviews why they thought this 
might be.
Ellîe ...the complete change around in th e  atm osphere when we
had th e  f ir s t  one and then th e  second one. The second
one was totally, it was dead quiet wasn't it? We were all
having a banter th e  f ir s t  one, but th e  second one we all 
kind of umm...
P . S .  Why do you think th a t  was? Have you any ideas?
Ellie I  don't know, don't know
Maybe we thought, "Oh right. Oh we've to  think about 
this!"
I  don't know.
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I t  was ju s t a change from us being flippant, not even 
flippant but you know what I  mean. Yeh to this... but it 
wasn't a bad change. We ju s t kind of thought about it a 
wee bit,
Sarah ... again I  wonder if ...in our minds not necessarily
perhaps, th a t th is was th e  kind of more important maybe.
And a more so rt of, I  don't know, yes I  think maybe more 
important where you fe lt  you'd to  so rt of ...Whereas th is 
was was more I  mean everybody was kind of laughing 
about what was going to  be on it..the glass of wine, th e  
candles and it was more a kind of relaxed thing, I  think, 
and ju s t your family and th e  so rt of things you, I  mean I  
say, things you were going to  enjoy. I  don't mean th a t I  
don't enjoy church, but it's a more serious form and its 
not maybe so relaxed...
It would seem from this study that when given the invitation to put themselves at the centre 
of the picture in a situation in which they feel good, women acknowledged those who share 
their lives, husbands, children, friends, but these others did not, literally, loom too large in 
the pictures. All expressed pleasure in solitary activities as well as in companionship
I note at this point that although given the opportunity and prompted to illustrate in 
someway feelings about their bodies, there was little direct reference to bodies in the 
writing on the pictures.
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The ‘selves’ projected on to the ‘big woman’
In the two workshop sessions that I set up, the participants completed their individual 
creative tasks and also a group task, guiding the drawing of what we came to call the ‘big 
woman’. I was more concerned in this instance with this exercise being a vehicle to enable 
discussion than with the actual picture that resulted. Comments and contributions of the 
participants while we drew the ‘big woman’ in each workshop were tape recorded and 
subsequently transcribed.
The selves that were presented in the conversations that took place while we drew the ‘big 
woman’ appeared to have been shaped by two major discourses or repertoires, that 
interwove and sometimes competed with one another. These I will characterise as ‘I’m 
worth it’ and ‘comfortable woman’. One appears to buy into body shaping regimes, such as 
are driven by advertising, “ Because I’m worth it”, being a current slogan for selling 
shampoo. This discourse validates the spending of some money and time, to ‘adjust’ body 
image, while still claiming that this is done by choice and for the woman herself rather 
than to please others . Is this due to some internalised ideal image driven by the media or is 
this what women would freely chose to do to feel good. It is hard, bearing in mind the 
foregoing discussion of the work of Foucault, to separate choice from cultural shaping in 
this respect.
Alongside this and sometimes in opposition to it there is expressed the attraction of being 
‘natural’ and comfortable, and the wish not to feel constrained to spend too much money 
and time on the body.
The inteiweaving of these discourses is illustrated by the following extracts from the first 
workshop. We notice, for instance, Sarah championing a little enhancement of the natural 
self:
Some of us only feel good about ourselves if we do something.
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while it is Lizzie who questions the need for make-up, and who most fervently champions a 
more natural self.
Does she wear make up?
I  can't bear th e  feel of th a t  s tu f f  on my skin.
The word ‘comfortable’ is used nineteen times in the conversations in the two workshops, 
and the women who say they want a little enhancement of nature still agree on the need for 
comfort and practicability.
Excerpts from the first group session
This conversation takes place as I draw the ‘big woman’, guided by the group.
P.S. So she doesn't mind spending a wee bit on her ...
Alison No she thinks she deserves...
Lizzie She's worth it
Alison She's good to  herself
P.S. Ok
Ellie Her make up would be p e rfec t
Lizzie Does she wear make up?
Ellie Well not a lot ...just enough to  make her feel... good
Sarah To enhance her
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Ellie Uh hu to  enhance her fea tu res
Lizzie I  ju s t put on th a t  s tu f f  th a t takes th e  shadows
out„.makes you look less like a panda and a bit of lippy 
and th a t's  me ..sorted
Ellie Aye, lippy and eye shadow
Sarah I  must admit I  use make up
Ellie Yeh it makes you feel good when you get up and put
your make up on..
but not too much- ju s t enough to enhance your 
appearance
Lizzie I  ju s t can't bear th e  feel of s tu f f  on my skin
(PS drawing big picture)
Alison She's got nice long eyelashes
Ellie Her eyebrows are  plucked to  perfection
P.S. She might though., if she were feel good woman., she
might ju s t let her self go and be natural
Several voices ... Yes ‘au natural'
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Alison Yes th a t's  what I  was thinking, they 're  natural long
eyelashes she doesn't need mascara
Lizzie Armpits a la grequel
(general laughter)
Alison Hairy legs
Lizzie I've got my winter legs ladies, (showing ankles under
trousers)
Ellie Ah no!
Lizzie I t s  too cold to go and get yer legs waxed
Sarah I  don't think she would let herself go if she was going
to feel good
Lizzie I s  it letting yourself go though?
Alison I t 's  a question of feeling good about yourself
Lizzie Priorities
Sarah Some of us only feel good about ourselves if we do
something
Alison I t 's  about feeling yourself worthy of a nice hair do
without being over th e  top 
P.S. For yourself ra th e r  than ...
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Ellie everybody else
Alison ...to please yer man
Sarah Because if you feel good then... it doesn't m atte r so
much how o ther people think about you
P.S. So she's um...there she is
She's ...is she
Lizzie She's got a really comfy bra on
(laughter )
Lizzie ...fits well, and enhances and is com fortable
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
Ellie But she would need to  be fo r herself ...do you know...
Alison I t 's  com fortable fo r her
Ellie Ah ha
Alison W hat she's com fortable with
P.S. Uh ha, so she wears what she's com fortable with
Sarah Yeh what she feels  is right
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
Sarah I  think you want shoes th a t  are com fortable no m atter
how fashionable they  are  they've got to be 
com fortable
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Lizzie You want to  be able to  run fo r th e  bus
Ellie Yeh they  have to  be com fortable
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
P.S. So she sometimes has hairy legs
Lizzie No no she doesn't, not with a short sk irt, even I  even I
wax my legs in th e  summer I  have to say, I've only got 
them like th is  because it's a bit cold. When you get 
them waxed you feel you've lost a layer of skin., ugh
(PS drawing)
Lizzie I  have to say th a t  I  ob ject in principle to  th e  fa c t
th a t she feels she has to  do th a t in order to  be 
com fortable but th e re  you go.
P .S . W hat, what th e  waxed and th e  shaved?
Lizzie th e  waxed and th e  shaved uh hu
When I  was a studen t I  used to  go with...I never used 
to shave my legs or wax my legs or anything like th a t. I  
was walking up Sauchiehall S t one day and th e re  were 
th ese  two wee boys walking along behind me, and I  
could hear th e  conversation " Do you think she's got a 
hairy chest as well, go and ask her"! (general laughter) 
I  went home and shaved my legs 
They walked past me and they turned round and had a 
look
P.S . Sooo th e  key thing...she likes to  look like she likes to
look and she likes to  be decorative, but she really tikes 
to  be com fortable
Ellie Do you think th a t  says something about us?
The second workshop session was different in a number of ways from the first. In the 
second workshop, there was one less person and the participants did not know each other so 
well. The second session was therefore quieter and more restrained. When we came to 
draw the ‘big woman’, nonetheless there were also comments which revealed the pressures 
to conformity that touched the women, and how they responded.
Excerpts from the second group session
P .S . W hat kind of shoes then  do you think she would have?
We've already talked a b it about shoes 
Really com fortable?
Dawn I  mean I  have to  say, I've always liked, if not fla t
shoes, almost f la t shoes. I've ju s t never got into 
wearing heels. I  mean its like people I  work with they 
love wearing heels and I  ju s t, I  think I  ju s t never, 
because I  never got into it when I  was younger. They 
ju s t feel so uncomfortable. And also I  like being able 
to  walk into work or walk around, and you ju s t can't 
walk.
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Felicity That was th e  thing with th e  Septem ber 11^ ,^ a f te r
th a t  th e  sale of high heel shoes went right down in 
New York, because they were all thinking, 'T f I  have 
to  ge t out of a high building quickly, th ese  are 
completely useless". So all com fortable shoes were 
really popular. And tig h t sk irts, th a t  was another thing 
went down .suddenly you think..
P.S. You can imagine th a t  can't you? In  any kind of
dangerous difficult situation you ju s t want to be able 
to  move
Down Yes its funny how all the , you know, fashionable are
really actually completely impractical. All so rt of 'going 
fo r a night out' clothes especially in th e  winter and its 
like th e  shops a t  th e  moment, lots of sandals and 
things. And I  suppose once you get where its  really hot 
its quite nice to  have open-toed sandals, but it's th e  
getting there .
Jeon I  put my boots on and carry th e  sandals in a bag
Down I  have contemplated them.(high heels) I  think partly
its th a t whole wardrobe change thing as well. All th e  
things I've got, like trousers, all th e  trousers  I've got 
would ju s t look d a ft if I  had high heels.
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The sk irts  I've got might be OK. I  think I  haven't got 
th a t  much money to  spend on getting everything, but 
if I  change my shoes and get something d iffe ren t. I 'd  
have to  buy s tu f f  to  go with it.
P.S. This is th e  ‘feeling good' woman, do you think she
dresses like th is  and so on fo r somebody else or is th is 
fo r her own?
Jean I  think she would dress like th a t  fo r herself
Dawn I  mean usually th e  dressing fo r someone else tends to
be th e  more impractical, doesn't it. W hether its 
dressing fo r an interview or something like th a t, its 
clothes th a t  make you feel more uptight.
P.S. That's an interesting thought
Felicity Becomes a prison I  think.
********************
Dawn Yeh I  think its one of those things th a t you probably
learn, as you kind of ge t more used to  th e  shape you 
a re  and how to  make th e  most of it, is what so rt of 
things you buy to  make th e  most of it
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Dawn Cos I  do remember a time when I  was young, skin
tigh t jeans were in and I  remember going to  th is 
shop in Brighton and trying on th ese  skin tigh t jeans, 
and I  was a wee b it on th e  podgy side, puppy f a t  I  
suppose, but maybe not. And I  remember th e re  were 
male shop assistan ts, and th a t  they were making 
comments about me and I  fe lt awful, but I  still 
wanted th e  jeans cos I  was a real tom boy.Didn't want 
to  wear sk irts  or anything and no-one had so rt of 
said " maybe you could try  wearing a d iffe ren t type 
of jeans" That's ju s t  what I  wore cos th a t's  what I  
did wear. So whereas I  think when you get to  be 
more aware of your body shape and so rt of think "Oh 
OK maybe you know not th e  tigh t fitting jeans...avoid 
those and get some looser fitting  things".
Again, it is possible here to trace two strands of influence on the way these women (and 
women in general, if we accept the Sept 1 story) regard themselves as they go about in 
the world. Firstly they are aware of the constraints of fashion, especially in situations such 
as dressing for a night out or dressing for a situation where you are judged by what you 
wear, but equally they appreciate the need to be safe and comfortable, and not have to 
spend too much money on how you look.
There seems here to be an acceptance of the need to sometimes conform to society’s 
expectations, but also a desire to work around them in the interests of bodily comfort. As 
Jean says I put my boots on and c an y  the sandals in a bag’. They recognise that 
conformity has its price and is restricting As Felicity expresses it, ‘Becomes a prison, I 
think’.
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The ‘selves’ presented in individual life-historv interviews
The interviews produced some veiy rich accounts and stories out of which I am choosing to 
focus on themes of coercion and resistance, partly because these emerged strongly in the 
group work. All of these women told of points in their lives where although subject to 
certain pressures to be or act or look in a certain way, they resisted and made a choice to 
‘be themselves.’ The pressures on them to conform to some ideal came from parents or 
spouses, cultural and media pressure, religious and moral codes. These pressures are not 
always altogether resisted but are sometimes accommodated and subverted with humour. 
Hearing these accounts makes clear to what extent we are all subjects in process over time.
Elite’s life-histoiv interview
Ellie recalled the drawing of the ‘big woman’ and this led her to tell of resisting her ex- 
husband’s definition of her as ‘nothing but a frump’ and her redefinition of herself after 
their divorce symbolised by clearing out her waidrobe and starting afresh.
Ellie And what we  said about th e  woman. How we pictured
th is lady and it has been, I  suppose, its  drummed into 
you th a t I  suppose, you're supposed to  have a nice 
figure, Na what you are  is more important
P .S . Yeh, it was interesting doing th a t with th e  big figure
cos th e re  was a lot coming out about her doing s tu f f  
fo r herse lf , ra th e r  than trying to  f i t  into an image
Ellie Yeh
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P .S . But its quite hard
Ellie Yeh, especially, I  suppose in th is day and age, I  don't
know about years ago. Well I  do because saying th a t 
when I  think about it. When (ex husband) and I  split 
up, I  cleared my wardrobe out completely, and gave 
everything to  th e  charity shop, and s ta r te d  afresh .
P .S . Right, so th is was you fo r you
Ellie Uh hu yes. Because he said " You're nothing but a
frump", and I  thought, "Right!"
P .S . Uh ha
Ellie And I  ju s t totally wiped th e  wardrobe clean. And
s ta r te d  again. And what I  wanted to  wear, not what, 
you know, what I  thought a 'mother' should wear. Or a 
'mother' should be, you know.
P .S . Ah ha, yes.
Ellie But again I  suppose, I  wouldn't have done th a t. No I
wouldn't have,.probably if I 'd  still been married I  
wouldn't have done half th e  things I've done.
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Ellie But um no I  said to  (twin s is te r) ” I  cleared my
wardrobe out" she says "What?" I  said " I t s  not me - 
I'm going to  be me from now on"
Ellie goes on to make clear that she recognises the fact that with children, there are still 
responsibilities and constraints, but when she has the chance she values making choices and 
being ‘me’.
Sarah’s life-historv interview
In her individual interview, Sarah, at different points expresses a lack of confidence in 
herself as an interesting person. It not clear what has led Sarah to feel like this. She says 
that she does not really like to talk about herself and how she feels.
Sarah I  think I'm b e t te r  now, but I  think before  I  really, I
um didn't kind of like to  talk about anything like th a t, 
you know, I  found it d ifficult ju s t to kind of say th a t's  
what I  fe lt
 but I  think it is quite difficult or a t least I
personally find it d ifficult to  talk about me if you like, 
you know. Sadly I  don't think I'm very interesting 
(laughs) I  really feel people are  not th a t in terested  in 
what I  might have to  soy.
It is clear both from what she wrote on her pictures and from other parts of her interview 
that she also projects a self who is veiy interested in gaining knowledge, an interest she has 
pursued successfully in various ways. It is then possible to see Sarah engaging in what
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Foucault has called ‘technologies of self over the course of her life and following paths 
that are rewarding for her, in spite of the less-than-confident self that she reveals at times.
Lizzie’s life history interview
Lizzie told a number of stories during her interview, some of which centred on how she has 
come to deal with issues to do with weight and body image. While obviously touched by 
some of the current cultural pressures to conform to a certain size and shape,she addresses 
such issues with self awareness, assurance and humour. She speaks about her regular visits 
to the swimming baths, and then tells a story which shows how she reacts to such pressures.
Lizzie Erm so I'm getting more laid back about being seen
without a towel wrapped round me and s tu ff . I  still 
p re fe r to  walk around with something wrapped round 
me but it doesn't bo ther me as much as it used to.
You know, you go through a phase of thinking 
" Everybody's looking a t me" And then you think "Well 
actually everybody isn't" You know and o ther people 
aren 't worrying about you looking a t them  either.
Do you know what I  decided to  do recently? I  got all 
d ressed up. I  got myself, I  was discussing, I  was a t a 
school reunion a couple of weeks ago and a friend and 
I ,  in our cups, were bemoaning th e  fa c t th a t  we'd 
discovered our cleavages about twenty-five years too 
late. And how when we were in the  eighties it was all 
th ese  high necks. You'd Laura Ashley up to  your chin.
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I  had this. I've got th is marvellous top th a t I  love, 
th a t  I  got in th e  S helter shop, and it's a tigh t black 
Lycra top with a V neck and it has little diamante 
things stuck on it round th e  neck of it, and I  love th is 
thing and its quite, I  mean its very tigh t, it ju s t f its  
where it touches so rt of thing.
I've got a pair of s tre tc h  black jeans th a t  I  got cheap 
and I've got a silvery jacket th a t I  got also in a 
charity shop. The en tire  o u tfit cost less than twenty 
pounds, which is very pleasing. Erm, and I  put th is lot 
on and in order to  convince myself th a t I'm drop dead 
gorgeous I  say to  myself...
In stead  of saying " I'm really fa t, I  never used to be 
th is fa t. I'm so f a t  you know, its horrible", I  say to 
myself, or I  pretend I'm going to  say to  o ther people, 
"Actually, I've ju s t lost th re e  stone in weight. I  used 
to  be enormous. I  feel fan tastic  now!" (laughing) And 
I  go away out, so rt of with a spring in my step, 
thinking about my imaginary th re e  stone th a t  I've 
shed, you know. Feeling wonderful
Alisou’s life-historv interview.
The constraints and coercions to meet other’s expectations, seem to come for Alison from 
the expectations placed on her in her role as a deacon in the Church of Scotland and the
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expectation of, for example, her dressing in a certain way. This also reflects the
expectations she grew up with about dressing in a certain way for church
Alison I  would never, I've never worn trousers to  church on a
Sunday. I  have th is thing 
th a t about being sm art.
P .S . Sm artly dressed?
Alison Wearing a sk irt and th a t's  been, not ju s t because I
work fo r th e  church but even before  then, I  would 
have always have this...
P .S . bo you think th a t  is o ther people's expectations or
something you do fo r yourself?
Alison I  think it probably is o ther, I  think I  would be "Oh I
might offend." The old ladies might think th a t's  
terrib le , and some of them'11 be wearing 
trousers....sm art trousers but I  don't have particularly 
sm art tro u sers  anyway. And I  suppose th e  way I  was 
brought up, because my Mum she never wore tro u sers  
anyway and she would certainly say if I  was home, "Oh 
Alison, you'd b e t te r  not go to  church like tha t"  But its, 
its offending, I  don't think God would bo ther but its 
about offending people. W hat people might think.
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However this appears to be a constraint that does not weigh too heavily. More significantly, 
there is a strong thread running through Alison’s account of her church life as it developed, 
of concern for issues of justice and a growing involvement with those at the margins of 
society. Her resistance appears to be more directed against situations of injustice and 
violence. She reveals this part of herself in her passionate involvement in a protest against 
nuclear weapons at Faslane. This is one of the moments in her life that she would describe 
as sacred.
AUson Certainly, I  always remember a t Faslane, having 
communion out a t th e  ....and th a t  was a really sacred 
spiritual ...but it was awwe really spiritual doing it in 
that., outwith a church building.Jn certainly what 
wasn't a sacred...you wouldn't call it holy ground 
standing outside Faslane but it was very, became a 
very holy moment. Incredibly, incredibly, powerful, 
moving.
PS
Alison
P S .
Alison
Can you say any more about why th a t would be?
I  think th e  setting  and th e  context ah ha, ah ha
Would it be to  do with th e  value of life?
Ah ha, protesting about something th a t you fe lt wasn't 
valuing life, but within th e  sacram ent th e  real valuing 
of life and th e  love of Cod, and th e  sacrifice of Cod 
fo r us in his son.
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I  mean It was really realty powerful . I  don't know if I  
can really express it very well.
And saying, I  remember saying th e  Lord's prayer as 
well, like " Thy Kingdom come" when you were thinking 
about working fo r th e  kingdom of Cod and peace in th e  
world and it ju s t it ju s t, sometimes you're ju s t saying 
th a t in church. I t  became much more powerful 
Uh hu
Felicity’s life-historv interview
One person strongly affected by what she would now see as a restricting religious up-bring 
was Felicity. Much of Felicity’s subsequent life, to her present age of 53, appears to have 
involved resisting and finding freedom from this. She talks about her efforts to carve out 
space to be herself as she grew up, finding relief from restricting pressure when she went 
abroad and met different kinds of Christians
She is able to see that her near anorexia was her struggling to find some space and exert 
some control over her situation. As well as the usual controlling discourses that young 
women experience she experienced specific constraints because her family belonged to a 
sub-set of society, evangelical Christianity. The battleground, the area where the struggle 
for control was fought out seems to have centred on her appearance, and her emergence as 
a social and sexual being.
Felicity So its very much part of my up-bringing. Sometimes
good and sometimes not so good.
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Urn e r.„ It was only really when I  went abroad e r r  to  
Nigeria and I  worked with e r urn and I  worked with a 
m ixture of people from d iffe ren t countries, a lot of 
Americans actually, th a t  I  realised th a t  everybody 
wasn't th e  same in term s of how they  were as a 
Christian.
I  think um th e re  was a lot of kind of pressure so rt 
of and guilt around th e  whole kind of thing about 
what you should and oughtn't “should" and “oughtn't" 
were so often  used. That was quite a..I found th a t 
quite a negative aspect and you know things like 
"Well if you don't go to  th e  prayer meeting and 
you're th e  m inisters daughter then who will ...kind of 
that's....! found th a t  quite heavy.
Yeh yeh well I  think as um a young child, urm I  
divided th e  congregation in my mind into two, th e  
people who smiled a t  you and th e  people who glared 
a t you. (laughs) And I  mean a lot of people were 
really nice, but th e re  were some who were...
But um, urmmm as a teenager it was much more 
difficult, cos Dad was still around a t th e  youth club.
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So th a t wasn't any getting away and I  really didn't 
have any social life much apart from them being, him 
being running around.
Which um wasn't th a t  I  didn't want him th e re , th a t  I  
didn't like him or anything, it ju s t meant th a t  I  didn't 
have any room to  grow.
Felicity’s adult choice of church has led her now to a congregation of tolerance and 
openness. She spoke of her feeling of ease in her present congregation, in contrast to her 
early life experience.
Felicity Um. I  think th e  music has a big pull for me.
And th e  fa c t th a t th e re 's  not really pressure on you 
to  be or to  do anything in particular, erum. and so 
you've got across th e  spectrum , th e re  isn't a kind of 
a coat th a t  you have to put on to  be a member, you 
know whereas th e re  are in so rt of evangelical, and 
th e re  isn't a kind 'in' language, you know th a t so rt of 
speak, where you speak...that was a relief. And its 
very creative. I  like th a t  really, yeh.
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Yeh yeh yes. So many befo re  so rt of “shoulds" and 
"shouldn'ts". And its so rt of inappropriate, and its 
like, it ju s t so rt of weighs on you all th e  time th is 
kind of expectation. Yeh. I  don't fee! th a t.
Felicity also told a long story from her childhood, about the harsh treatment of a 
homosexual curate by the church her family belonged to. She spoke of her relief at finding 
different attitudes to sexual orientation In the church which she now attends.
Pawn’s life-historv interview
In her interview Dawn showed an awareness of the pressures that women are subjected to 
to have the perfect body, as she had done in the group work with her story of buying jeans, 
but she seems able to resist such pressui e.
Dawn Erm but equally I  think th e re  can be a thing in society
where it's a b a ttle  of th e  body and th e  mind, and th e  
so rt of mind thing of wanting to  get your body p erfec t 
and wonderful and sometimes you need to  say "Well its 
my body, it does what it's supposed to do and th a t's  
really th e  b e s t thing (laughing) you know.
P.S . Yes, yes
Down Erm ra th e r  than thinking, ” I  wish I  had a body like so
and so" or whatever.
Sometimes pressures to conformity have come from the religious context. Dawn described 
in her interview how the first church that she went to when she left home was, almost by
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chance, a Pentecostal Church, and she describes their attitude to what should be worn to 
church
Down Erm but it was also a church...it was quite funny when
I  was doing th a t  thing about what you wear in church.
My home church when I  went to  it growing up it was 
absolutely., you know you ju s t wore what you wore.
Erm th e re  were people who dressed up, I  think it was 
more, you know an older generation wearing Sunday 
best. But I'd  never really encountered th a t  myself.
And it was funny cos when I  went to  th is church it 
was, I  wasn't aware of it a t f ir s t  but I  remember 
some people making comments about this guy who was 
there . And th e  trend  was fo r ripped jeans a t th a t 
time, and they  were scandalised, and I  thought "Of 
all th e  things you could be scandalised about!" 
(laughing)
And equally erm th e re  was a couple of lads th a t came 
in one day and goodness knows why they  came in, but 
I  think , I  don't know if it was partly th a t  they were 
d ressed  in s tu f f  th a t  were not of th e  normal but also
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partly th is  slightly predatory thing of, "Oh good 
people we can corner afterw ards and speak to  them  
about Jesus!" (laughing)
They made a very quick getaway before th e  service 
ended!
She also describes however the way in which in company with other very good strong 
women friends’ it was possible to resist some of the more sexist views which she saw as 
partly stemming from the religious context and partly from the more general cultural 
context of the North East of England.
Dawn .... again I  had some very good friends, very good
strong women friends a t th e  church and I  think 
th e re  was a group of us would ju s t kind of go "Well 
th e re 's  a lot of it th a t 's  actually nonsense" The 
women doing th e  te a  and th e  men moving th e  chairs 
and its like "For goodness sake you know we're not 
th a t weak! We can move chairs you know"!
I t  ju s t seemed very much more delineated between 
sexes. And w hether th a t  was also more of a thing of 
It being Newcastle as well. Cos I  think Newcastle was 
a little bit more traditional in th e  way of th e  roles of 
what people did, as much as it being th a t  particular 
church. I  don't know. But um yeh it was quite 
interesting erm .
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Dawn has not continued to belong to a congregation with such rigid sexual stereotyping 
thus choosing a different religious context for herself. She speaks of how much she now 
values less rigid more open forms of worship which she finds in her present congregation
.. . . It  is th a t slightly poetic language th a t 
encompasses so rt of th e  depth of d iffe ren t 
responses and things like th a t  . And th e  way th a t 
(minister) usually talks Is in th a t way. The Iona or 
th e  Celtic hymns and even you know th e  older hymns 
th a t  we have many of them have a so rt of depth to 
them th a t  I  really like.
I  think it allows interpretation. And its like er, its 
like a r t  work in a way. I  mean if you you've got a 
simplistic b it of a r t  work ...it ju s t so rt of says “ th is 
is it boom boom". Well you can appreciate it but 
maybe you don't get so involved because you don't 
have to  put th e  input in.
W hereas if its  something th a t's  a little  b it more, not 
necessarily ab s trac t, but a little b it more, you know 
got d iffe ren t layers to  it then, you can engage with 
whichever layer is appropriate to  you a t th a t  time.
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And I  think th a t's  why it works well because you 
know if you've got a variety of people sitting in th e  
church, some of them  having a g reat time a t th a t  
precise moment, someone having an awful time then 
its its  perhaps a way of reaching out to  everyone.
..that everyone can get something from it. 
W hatever's appropriate to  them  a t th a t time.
Jean’s Hfe-historv interview
Jean, the oldest of the participants at 65, made clear early in her interview, just how 
contented she is with her present life. Looking at the figures in her first picture she says,
I've put "alone and a t ease". That is amongst people 
(the dancing figure) and th a t  (the seated  figure) is 
alone. But I'm really very content in my life which a lot 
of people aren 't. I  mean I  know an awful lot of people 
who are  unhappy fo r various reasons.
I  mean I'm no happy all th e  time nobody is but erm 
th ere 's  usually a reason fo r it. And I've ju s t met so 
many people who I  feel they'll never be really content 
whatever they've got th e re 's  always something wrong.
So I  really feel th a t  I'm a very lucky person.
It was not always so for her. In her childhood she was often made to feel awkward and 
clumsy.
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Jean I  was th e  most awkward child,
P.S. Ah ah
Jean Definitely, I  was always breaking s tu ff . I f  th e re  was
a puddle I  fell in it
P.S . Ah ah
Jean And awh . My fa th e r  didnae help much mind you, he
used to shout, th e  main he shouted th e  mair I  broke.
P.S . You ju s t fe lt  awkward?
Jean So it was quite good to  discover th a t I  could dance.
P.S. The way people talk to you when you're younger really
affects...
Jean My fa th e r  was, he was like th a t with us all. But
especially me cos I  was the  oldest
P.S . Uh hu
Jean I  would go to  do th e  dishes and he would s ta r t
shouting and th e  mair mair he shouted th e  mair I  
broke
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P.S. And sometimes it needs somebody outside th a t  to  see
you...
Jean Ah ha
P.S. ..differently
Jean As I  say, I  really always fe lt  awkward, and I  was a
person who always tripped and everything else and I
got th is chance a t school. I  le ft school a t fifteen . 
There was a chance came up in school to  go fo r a 
months course. A months thing up to  Aviemore 
(talk about th is course)
..and we all got on and mucked in and th e re  was a wee 
click here (indicates her head) something I  did and I  
went "Now wait a minute". I  was only fif teen  and I  
thought " None of th e se  people know me, they don't
know I'm stupid and they  don't know I  trip  over
everything and they  don't know th a t I  break things", 
and th a t  was it and th e  f ir s t  time I  tripped I  made a 
joke of it and it was past.
P.S. Ah ha
Jean And th a t gave me all th e  confidence in th e  world.
I  don't know it was ju s t something th a t  clicked, and 
I  thought, "Wait a wee minute. They're not expecting 
me to  be stupid."
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We were all taking one another as we were. So th a t 
really did give me a big boost.
With Jean’s account of her childhood we again encounter an oppressive parental 
expectation, the expectation of clumsiness and failure. Jean is later able to resist and 
overcome this through being seen differently by others. Also finding that she was good at 
dancing and could be co-ordinated and graceful in her body greatly increased her 
confidence.
Sacred bodies?
While for the bulk of the individual interviews I wanted the participants to shape their story 
and tell me in their own way of their ‘journey’, I was also seeking their response to the 
question of whether or not they understood their bodies as sacred (whatever might be meant 
by that). When they had finished telling me of their church history, this was one question 
that I asked quite directly
When asked if they regarded their bodies as sacred I encountered some fairly emphatic 
denials firom a number of participants.
Ellie said,
Ummmm I  don't know, I  think your body, th e  way you t r e a t  
yourself is important and I  don't know if I  would say I  was 
sacred,
Sarah and Jean were definite in their responses:
P.S. Would you ever think of yourself as being a kind of
sacred ....
Sarah No.
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p .s .  ..being?
Sarah No, No.
P.S. You've a d iffe re n t kind of ...
Sarah Yuh ha
P.S. Yourself comes into th e  kind of 'other' compartment ?
Sarah Oh definitely...low down as well (laughs)
Let's be absolutely honest, no I  don't see  myself as ..as
sacred special anything like th a t  
No, no.
Jean’s response was also very decided
Jean I  couldna think of myself as sacred.
P S . So you wouldn't think of yourself as sacred. That
wouldn't be a term  you would..
Jean Definitely not a term . ..
I  try  to  be good th a t's  th e  b es t I  can do.
Felicity also revealed a stmggle for bodily affirmation, which she recognised as rooted in 
an upbringing that had been controlling and negative about the physical.
I l l
Felicity
P.S.
Felicity
P.S.
Felicity
I  think, I  mean th a t  was another aspect of upbringing, 
th a t  um I  think I've a very, had a very poor image self 
esteem  and in body.
I  think as a teenager and into adult I  had a very low 
sense of body and th a t  wasn't encouraged a t all. I  
think th a t  was not a good idea. Or anything to  do 
with...No no it was ju s t really not helpful.
Do you feel you've moved on from th ere?
A bit but I  mean I  would have a long way to  go
Err body awareness and happiness in one's own body, I  
think th a t took a long time. And I  was quite, I  was 
so rt of bordering on anorexic fo r quite a while.,.as a 
teenager and th a t was partly to  do with th e  control. 
And I  know, they  say quite often  it's to  do with th a t  
and it absolutely was to  do with th a t. Umm having 
some space.
Yes yes.
And, e rr, and th e  whole thing of boy friends and so on 
you know cos I  didn't have a social life really th e re  
was nothing really possible, so th a t was very bad.
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Alison and Lizzie were not so emphatic in their denials that their bodies could be regarded
as sacred they rather deflected the question, to some extent, away from bodies.
Alison responded,
I  think a t tim es when you feel you've been used by 
God maybe in a special way.
Or when you're really feeling...there are times when 
you really feel especially th a t  you have a sense of 
being loved.
I  think th a t can be a sacred moment.
Lizzie offered an understanding of what she called the ‘vital force’ which she saw as
permeating all life.
P .S . So fo r you really life is perm eated by, life in all its
forms really is perm eated by th is whatever we call it, 
energy or spirit?
Lizzie Energy, spirit, vital force. I  tend to  think of it in
term s of th e  Holy Spirit as much as anything else. Um 
your alternative th erap ists  will call it a vital force.
P .S . Uh ha.
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Lizzie But its  th e  same thing. I t 's  what gives life to
everything, you know.
P .S . And so presumably you would say th a t's  p resent in
each of us?
Lizzie Yeh.
P .S . So if th a t  was what we were meaning by sacred, then
th a t  would be within, you would be able to  say your 
body was sacred?
Lizzie Sacred's a funny term , it depends how you define
sacred. But I  think th e  difficulty is only one o f  
syntax...of vocabulary. I  think th e  vocabulary limits 
what th e  thing is. You know, because sacred has 
been a ttrib u ted  to  specifics, and this is is bigger 
than th a t, or its minute, it doesn't m atte r really.
It was Dawn, in her response, who came closest among the participants, to embracing an
understanding of the body as sacred. She stressed that for her car e and respect for the body
were very important especially in more ‘permissive’ society.
Dawn Erm, a t tim es yes, I  do think, I  think one of th e  things
th a t  isn't necessar ily  recognised and spoken about in 
society because it is quite a, a not permissive society
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exactly, is th is  thing of saying,"Look if you do s tu f f  it 
does a f fe c t  you. You can't ju s t so rt of say, " It won't", 
you know *T can walk away from this". You know, 
things...if, you know, I  ju s t so rt of think th e re  is this 
so rt of thing, say if you, erm, even if you ea t too much, 
you know, you have a sickly feel, th a t so rt of "Ooph, 
I've eaten  too much", and it can ju s t make you feel 
heavy. So yes, I  think erm, it is quite important to  so rt 
of recognise th e  fa c t th a t  your body has an impact on 
th e  way you feel both emotionally, spiritually as well I  
think.
While it seemed to be difficult for the women I spoke to use the word ‘sacred’ to refer to 
their bodies and themselves, they readily identified moments in their lives that had a quality 
they were prepared to call sacred or numinous. Noticeably for a number of respondents 
these included moments of birth of their children and/or the death of parents. They also 
saw other life experiences and events as having this quality, some moments of interaction 
with nature and with others, especially those seen to be in need. What emerged was a sense 
of the sacred interwoven with life and not something set apart. This discoveiy has led me 
to reconsider the value of suggesting that women’s bodies might be re-configured as 
‘sacred’, and to consider the greater importance of celebrating and affirming women’s 
creativity and choices in our everyday lives, and supporting one another by alliances and 
advocacy.
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Conclusion
This study was fired by a passionate concern over the violence that happens to the bodies of 
women, through out the world simply because they are women (see Schussler Fiorenza 
1996 39-55). While realising the causes of this situation are many and complex, my 
concern has led me to wonder why the bodies of women in particular, are so vulnerable to 
abuse in many societies. It has led me on a journey, to tiy to discover how bodies might be 
understood, how they come to carry the meanings that they do and how and why they 
summon up the responses that they do. As I began this search I thought that there might be 
a way to re-value bodies in society. I wanted to explore the possibility of society re-valuing 
bodies, to inscribe them as ‘sacred’, (understood as held in the highest esteem and 
inviolable) and so offer them some protection.
Seeking to know why the current situation exists and how it might change, I reviewed some 
theoretical understandings of the ‘body’. My search led me to some of the work of major 
theorists, Foucault and Butler. I drew on Foucault’s earlier work on disciplined and 
‘docile’ bodies, and his later thinking on resistance to the techniques of power. Importantly 
for this quest, Butler’s work offered the concept that ‘ bodies never quite comply with the 
norms by which their materialisation is impelled’, opening the possibility of change in the 
construction of bodies in society.
I then engaged with the work of Merleau-Ponty, Caputo and Scarry, which raised the issue 
of what might shape our relationships one to another, what might summon an empathie 
rather than a violent response and what might assist those who suffer. Our mutually 
inhabiting the same flesh, a ‘poetics of obligation’ summoned by flesh, and advocacy were 
all offered as responses to the ‘Other’, especially the other reduced to inarticulate suffering 
‘flesh’.
In my search however I was more concerned to find a way in which social change might 
lead to a prevention of violence rather than with responses after the event. In the work of
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Kristeva I was led to a possible way to understand the roots of violence and a new model 
for ethical response grounded in the maternal body.
Sympathetic to the claims of feminist standpoint epistemology, I believed it was important 
to view this question from the standpoint of women, who while different in many ways ar e 
all shaped by regimes of power and in our contemporary society vulnerable to, if not 
victims of, violence. I was interested in how women resist techniques of power, and in the 
scope for agency and making-of-self that we have in our lives in contemporary society.
Underlying this search was also an interest in the part played by religion in women’s 
oppression/liberation. Ï agree with Margaret Miles that ‘Not only can religion make 
available tools with which women may create a degree of spiritual, political and personal 
autonomy, not provided by secular culture, but it also inevitably forms part of women’s 
cultural conditioning’ ( Miles 1985 :2).The seven women I chose to as research participants 
were all life long church members.
Alerted to the fact that traditional structured interviewing is not always the most effective 
way to access feelings and motivations, especially of women, I experimented with a 
creative method to explore experience as well as employing group and life-history 
interviewing techniques which are valued as methods in feminist research. These methods 
combined to produce some rich and enlightening data.
What I discovered by these methods, from these women, was that the ‘body’ is indeed the 
site of operation of discourses of power. These women had been affected in different ways 
by these various ‘shaping’ discourses, some of which are cultural and some religious or 
moral. The women I interviewed were aware of, and had been touched in their own lives 
by such things as:
Moral imperatives, concerning behaviour, sometimes embedded in a particular 
church- teaching and ethos.
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Sexist culture, closely defining gender roles, again sometimes also veiy much part 
of church culture.
The ‘shaping’ discourses in contemporary culture related to body size and image 
and what is considered ideal for women.
Having confidence undermined by negative comments on the body, with regard to 
clumsiness, weight, clothes etc.
Issues of fashion and style, and the question of dressing to meet others expectations, 
and the appropriate clothes for church.
Issues of sexuality and the response of the church to homosexuality.
Bodies as sites of resistance.
Conducting the life-history interviews meant that I was able to see, to some degree, the 
impact that these ‘shaping’ discourses had had on these women. For some, impacting on 
their lives as they grew up, they had left a lasting and difficult legacy. I was also able to 
see how these women resisted and responded to these discourses. It became clear as I 
shared in this research process that if bodies are potentially ‘moulded by a great many 
distinct regimes’(Foucault 1978:39), they are also sites of resistance and self- determination 
(Graham 1995:139) for the women in this study.
As mature women, these respondents made it clear that they found pleasure in and though 
their bodies. They enjoyed the sensual; touch, warm baths, candles, silky and soft fabrics 
and colours, the sights, sounds and smells of the natural world. They took pleasure in what 
they did with their bodies; swimming, walking, jogging, dancing, painting and drawing, 
and healing, and gestating babies.
With regard to fashion, makeup and clothes, they were aware that there were times when 
they would have to dress in a certain way for certain occasions. While they were aware of 
such constraints, the impression they gave was that they would respond to them, or not, on 
their own terms, sometimes subversively with wit and humour. They would chose, or not, 
to spend time and money on their appearance. Mostly they thought they should dress to
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please themselves and comfort was an important consideration in the matter of clothes. Just 
how free such choices are however, from conditioning and influence, in the face of 
advertising and the influence of the media in this respect, remains a contentious issue.
Overall, for these women what emerges is a sense of them enjoying the life of their bodies. 
For some it has obviously been a difficult journey to get to this point and to resist some of 
the more damaging effects of controlling, shaping discourses that have impacted on them. 
For some this impact was heightened by the discourses being embedded in a particular 
religious culture.
Bodies as sites of religious imagination
It has been more difficult to get a clear picture in this study of the relationship between the 
participants’ embodied selves and their religious lives. The creative exercise appeared to 
show that the worship context was a more sombre, less bright, less sensual, more serious 
one than that of their everyday lives. There was a sense of a more passive, serene, inward- 
looking mode in the worship context, in which the body was not so actively engaged.
However the services and rituals that they spoke of as having most meaning for them, were 
those that involve particular bodily/sensual engagement; communion, baptism, healing, 
alternative worship with video screens, symbolic use of natural objects, and candles; with 
music and singing also being mentioned as important. It would be good in a future study to 
explore this aspect more fully to discover why these are particularly meaningful.
The women that I spoke to were not in the congregations, and sometimes not in the 
denominations and religious traditions, in which they had grown up. They had, as they 
grew older, made distinctive choices about where and how they wished to worship. This 
may be why they had positive rather than negative things to say about their current worship 
context. It may also be why they did not express the frustration or Tack of fit’ with their 
worship context that I have heard from other women, and had thought I might discover.
20 See Cooey 1994:41-62
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Only one raised the question of non-inclusive language herself, and when I explored this 
issue with others, it did not appear to be a major concern, possibly because it is addressed 
to an extent in the churches in which they worship.
This study was undertaken with women who have chosen to belong to and worship in a 
particular religious context which might be described as theologically and morally liberal, 
creative, open, allowing for a range of self expression. This will undoubtedly have shaped 
their feelings about themselves and their church life.
It would be enlightening to undertake a similar study with other groups of women, for 
example:
those who are in more ‘conservative’ evangelical charismatic churches
those who have moved outwith main-stream churches and are part of
alternative/women identified worship communities
women who have no religious practice or community.
Sacred bodies re-visioned
My question as to whether they regard their bodies as ‘sacred’ did not resonate with these 
women. I suggest that this was because ‘sacred’ for them meant something set apart and 
untouchable, and also something too holy for them to aspire to. This of course maybe 
because they have been conditioned into thinking in this way by a cultuie that has not 
valued women’s bodies highly.
This is not to say that they were unaware of a sacred or numinous quality to some of the 
things that happened to them in their lives, relating to birth and death, nature and 
interaction with others. Interestingly also, the numinous moments that they reported 
occurred outside any worship context and as part of the ongoing course of their lives.
Having conducted this study I now understand that if the word ‘sacred’ is to be used of 
bodies, and particularly of women’s bodies, then it needs take on a different meaning and 
imply rather than something set apart and special, a greater engagement, a more sensual
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involvement with the world. It needs to conjure up the creativity and resistance to 
damaging discourses with which women, on the evidence of this study, deal with their 
lives.
It could also indicate a collective as well as an individual way of being. These women do 
not shape their lives in isolation from one another. One aspect of church life that did come 
across as being important to the women in this study was the community aspect, the 
friendships and mutual support
Having undertaken this study, I have discovered women’s resilience and creativity in the 
face of discourses, religious and cultural, that would shape their bodies and their lives. I 
would suggest that one response that could be made in the face of violence that threatens 
women’s bodies and spirits, is to nurture this spirit of resistance in one another, to offer 
alternative readings of the value of bodies, to affirm sensuality and sexuality, in everyday 
life and religious life.
As Margaret Miles says
‘...it is not sufficient simply to identify in any particular society the forms of 
oppression of women. An accurate sense of women’s experience can come only 
from detecting both the ideologies and institutions that oppress and the struggle of 
women to create active and fulfilling lives for themselves and their daughters. If we 
look only for oppression we will miss the creativity with which women... have 
foraged in their cultural environments for the tools with which to make their lives.
....What emerges when we look for women’s creativity within their cultures as well 
as the cultural forms of their oppression is a growing awareness of a process by 
which women receive and create the patterns of their lives. The process is always a 
blend of identifying, adapting and rejecting fragments of the cultural fabric that 
contribute or detract from their lives’ (Miles 1985:3).
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Appendix 1
Instructions for creative exercises
A l
Outline of activity
Please imagine your body in a situation in which you feel good, in 
which you feel most ‘yourself ...it might be a particular time or place 
you are thinking of.
P lease draw your body, just a  simple outline, in the middle of the 
blank shee t of paper, in whatever way you think best conveys this 
feeling. It can be in any posture, and as  big or small as  you like, but 
with som e space  around it.
As you imagine yourself, feeling good, do you have any sen se  of 
what you might be wearing, (if anything)? Can you write, draw, stick 
things on, on or around the body to indicate this? W hat do you most 
like to wear? What colours do you enjoy wearing? W hat fabrics?
Do you have any favourite jewellery? Can you write or illustrate 
these on the picture?
Is there anything you want to express about your body as  a whole or 
about any part of it in this situation-good feelings, sad  feelings, 
angry feelings, questions? Again, can you express these  feelings on 
or around the body, in words, symbols or pictures?
What things and people are important to you to have around you, 
make you feel alive, give a se n se  of well-being? Can you add them 
to this picture with words, symbols, or pictures ?
Can you think about what, of what you do with your body, makes 
you feel most alive? Can you write that somewhere on the sheet ?
Is there a story, incident, memory, you could tell about feeling good 
in/about your body, that you could tell me when we meet later?
A l - i i
Outline of 2*^  ^activity
1 would like you now to think of yourself in your normal worship 
situation, or if you don’t have one at present, in one that is familiar to 
you from the past. You could think of a particular place and time. It 
should be a reality you know rather than an ideal worship situation.
On the next blank sh ee t (Response sheet 2) please draw your body 
in a  simple outline to convey how you feel about being there. This 
may be different from the first body you drew, in size, or shape or 
posture. P lease allow som e sp ace  around it.
What about clothes for this situation? Are there ones you feel you 
should wear, or would choose to wear? Can you indicate what they 
are on the picture? What about colours? What about jewellery?
Are there any feelings that you would have about your body as  a 
whole or about any part of it in this situation -  good feelings, sad 
feelings, angry feelings, questions? Can you express these  feelings 
on or around the body you have drawn? Again this can be in any 
way you wish words, symbols or pictures.
What people or objects are significant to you in this setting? Can you 
indicate them on your picture?
What, if anything, of what happens in this worship situation m akes 
you feel alive and good in/about your body ? What, if anything, 
deadens feeling? What, if anything, is frustrating, upsetting, 
maddening? Can you note or indicate this on the sheet?
Is there a story about your body and a worship situation that you 
could tell me when I meet with you later?
Appendix 2
Drawings from creative exercises
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